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I.  About Privacy 
 
The Consumer Federation of America (CFA) and the National Credit Reporting 
Association (NCRA) designed the details of this study with advice from legal counsel to 
ensure the methodology would comply with the requirements of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, Gramm Leach Bliley Act, and other consumer privacy laws.  From the outset, each 
organization was mindful of the ethical spirit and intent of these consumer protection and 
privacy laws.  In this day of rampant identification theft, we carefully evaluated each 
segment of the study workflow to ensure that we analyzed data extracted from the credit 
files without any trace of personal identifiers.  Regarding consumer identity, all non-
public, personal information data was completely “blind” as to a source for analysis.  No 
names, addresses, social security numbers, dates of birth, account numbers, or any other 
item that could be used in any way to trace back to a specific consumer were revealed to 
or recorded by any third party outside trusted personnel of the consumer reporting 
agencies involved in the study.  In one phase of the study the recorded data segment 
closest to the consumer was the postal zip code of their residence.   
 
After CFA made a random selection of the time frame from which credit files were to be 
analyzed, a generic number was assigned to keep the nameless study data from each 
study file separated from other study files.  No copies or partial copies of any credit 
reports, on paper or electronically, were removed from any credit reporting agency 
location.  Anonymous credit scores and an analysis of the credit data, as reviewed by 
credit reporting agency personnel for security and industry knowledge, was supervised 
and recorded by the CFA researcher for tabulation.  The data elements recorded in this 
study are insufficient to ever be used to track or identify any individual.  Further, the 
analytical data recorded, if ever obtained by unscrupulous individuals, contains no 
information that could ever be used to try to defraud any of the consumers or creditors 
connected to the files in the study.  Total anonymity to consumer identity and creditor 
accounts was, and will continue to be, strictly enforced.    
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II.  The Growing Importance of Credit Scores 
 
Consumer access to credit, housing, insurance, basic utility services, and even 
employment is increasingly determined by centralized records of credit history and 
automated interpretations of those records.   
 
Credit histories in one form or another have long been an important factor in decisions to 
extend or deny credit to consumers
1.  Historically, such decisions required a skilled, 
human evaluation of the information in an applicant’s credit history to determine the 
likelihood that the applicant would repay a future loan in a timely manner.  More 
recently, computer models have been developed to perform such evaluations.  These 
models produce numerical credit scores that function as a shorthand version of an 
applicant’s credit history to facilitate quick credit assessments. 
 
During the second half of the 1990s, mortgage underwriting increasingly incorporated 
credit scores and other automated evaluations of credit histories.  As of 1999, 
approximately 60 to 70 percent of all mortgages were underwritten using an automated 
evaluation of credit, and the share was rising
2. 
 
The automated quantification of the information in credit reports has not simply been 
used to decide whether or not to extend credit, but has also been used to set prices and 
terms for mortgages and other consumer credit.  In certain cases, even very small 
differences in scores can result in substantially higher interest rates, and less favorable 
loan terms on new loans. Credit scores are also used to determine the cost of private 
mortgage insurance, which protects the lender, not the consumer, from loss but is 
required on mortgages with down payments of less than twenty percent
3.  Lenders also 
review credit histories and/or credit scores to evaluate existing credit accounts, and use 
the information when deciding to change credit limits, interest rates, or other terms on 
those accounts.  
 
In addition to lenders, potential landlords and employers may review credit histories 
and/or credit scores.  Landlords may do so to determine if potential tenants are likely to 
pay their rent in a timely manner.  Employers may review this information during a hiring 
process, especially for positions where employees are responsible for handling large sums 
of money.  Utility providers, home telephone, and cell phone service providers also may 
request a credit report or credit score to decide whether or not to offer service to 
consumers.   
 
Insurance companies have also begun using credit scores and similar insurance scores – 
that are derived from the same credit histories – when underwriting consumer 
applications for new insurance and renewals of existing policies. Credit information has 
                                                 
1 Klein, Daniel.  2001.  Credit Information Reporting. Why Free Speech is Vital to Social Accountabilily 
and Consumer Opportunity. The Independent Review. Volume V, number 3. 
2 Straka, John.  2000.  A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: the 1990s Move to Automated Credit 
Evaluations.  Journal of Housing Research.  Volume 11, Issue 2. 
3 Harney, Ken.  August 18, 2002.  “Risk-based pricing brings a big rate hike for some.” Washington Post.  
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been used as a basis to raise premiums, deny coverage for new customers, and deny 
renewals of existing customers – even in the absence of other risk factors, such as moving 
violations or accidents.  Some providers claim that credit scores are also used to offer 
insurance coverage to consumers who have previously been denied, or to lower insurance 
rates.  This is a highly contested issue that is under review in dozens of state legislatures 
and insurance commissions. 
 
Thus, a consumer’s credit record and corresponding credit score can determine access 
and pricing for the most fundamental financial and consumer services.   
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III.  Controversial Issues Affecting Consumers 
 
The expanded use of automated credit evaluations has brought changes to the 
marketplace that have benefited consumers.  However, given the tremendous impact 
credit scores can have on consumers’ ability to access and afford basic necessities, the 
increased application of this tool has also raised serious concerns about the potential 
harm it can cause. 
 
A.  Speed 
 
The growth in use of credit scores has dramatically increased the speed at which many 
credit decisions can be made.  Especially for consumers with relatively good credit, 
approvals for loans can be given in a fraction of the time previously required, without any 
manual review of the information.  It is unlikely that underwriting the recent record 
volumes of mortgage originations would have been possible without the efficiencies 
provided by credit scoring.   
 
B.  Customized or Risk-Based Pricing 
 
Credit scores, as a quantitative shorthand for credit histories, increase the potential for 
customized pricing of credit based on the risk an individual poses.  Some argue that 
charging more to consumers defined as higher risk would remove some of the cost of risk 
carried by the general consumer population, and would allow for price reductions among 
consumers who pose less risk.  Others argue that the savings have not been – and are 
unlikely to be – passed on to consumers who pose less risk, and scoring systems simply 
allow lenders to extract greater profits from consumers who do not attain target credit 
scores.  The potential for increased profits from consumers whose credit is scored low 
also creates a disincentive to helping consumers correct errors in their credit records. 
 
The increased speed at which underwriting decisions can be made has created pressure to 
complete credit applications more quickly.  Some contend that the combination of this 
increased pace and the increased ability to customize the price charged based on credit 
allows lenders to approve a larger share of consumers for loans, but not necessarily at the 
best rates for which they qualify.  While many consumers can feel overwhelmed by large 
credit based transactions, such as mortgage closings, consumers who do not have a solid 
understanding of credit scores, or who do not objectively know their creditworthiness, are 
even more vulnerable to high-pressure tactics to accept any offer of credit, regardless of 
terms, and may unnecessarily be charged higher rates. 
 
C.  Effect on Discrimination 
 
Some have argued that increased reliance on automated reviews of credit has the 
potential to reduce discrimination in lending because the automation of decision-making 
removes or reduces the influence of subjective bias.  Others have argued that the factors 
used to determine a credit score may not completely remove bias from approval and 
pricing decisions.  Furthermore, lenders are still free to offer differential levels of  
  5 
assistance in dealing with errors in credit records, or with other issues related to credit 
scores, such as providing rescoring services.  Such discretionary assistance remains a 
potential source of bias in the approval process whether a consumer is underwritten with 
an automated system or with manual underwriting.  Federal banking regulators do 
conduct examinations to ensure against overt discrimination on prohibited bases such as 
race, sex, marital status, or age in credit score design or in lenders’ application of those 
scoring systems, such as through the use of overrides
4. 
 
D.  Statistical Validity 
 
Supporters of credit scoring note that credit scores have statistical validity, and are 
predictive of repayment behavior for large populations.  However, this does not mean 
that credit data are error free, nor that credit scoring models are perfect predictors of 
individual creditworthiness; it only means that they work on average.  While the systems 
do present an accurate risk profile of a large numbers of consumers, data users who 
manage large numbers of accounts priced by credit risk have a greater tolerance for errors 
in credit scoring systems than consumers do.  Among those consumers who are 
inaccurately characterized, businesses can balance errors in their favor against errors in 
favor of consumers; so long as enough consumers are charged higher rates based on 
inflated risk assessments to cover the losses from those who are charged lower rates 
because the systems incorrectly identified them as low risk, these businesses will suffer 
no material harm.  Consumers on the other hand do not have a similar tolerance for errors 
in transactions governed by credit reports and credit scores.  If they are overcharged 
because of an error in the credit scoring system, there is no countervailing rebate to set 
the statistical scales even.  Credit scores should not function as a lottery in which some 
consumers “win” by being viewed more favorably than they deserve to be, while others 
“lose” by being viewed less favorably than they should be. 
 
While debate surrounding the broad implications of credit scoring continues, its use is 
already strongly established in the American financial services industry.  Meanwhile, 
concern over the integrity of credit scoring itself focuses on two dimensions – the fairness 
of the models that interpret the data and the accuracy of the underlying credit related data.  
 
E.  Untested Scoring Formulas 
 
Even if all credit data regarding consumers held at credit repositories were accurate, 
complete, and current, there would be significant concerns about the fairness of 
automated credit scoring programs. Converting the complex and often conflicting 
information contained in credit reports into a numerical shorthand is a complex process, 
and requires a significant number of interpretive decisions to be made at the design level.  
From determining the relative influence of various credit-related behaviors, to the process 
used to evaluate inconsistent information, there is a great potential for variance among 
scoring system designs.   
                                                 
4 See for example Appendix B of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s Comptroller’s Handbook 
for Compliance, Fair Lending Examination Procedures, available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/fairlep.pdf  
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Despite the gatekeeper role that these scoring systems play regarding access to credit, 
housing, insurance, utilities, and employment, as well as pricing for those essentials, 
exactly how the formulas perform the transformation from credit report to credit score is 
a closely guarded secret.  For consumers, regulators, and even industry participants who 
rely on the computations in their decision-making, the scoring models largely remain a 
“black box.”  No scholarly reviews of this extremely powerful market force have been 
permitted, and apart from reviews by federal banking regulators to protect against 
discrimination no government regulator has insisted that they be examined to ensure that 
they are adequate and fair.   
 
Recently, after California passed a law requiring all consumers in the state to have access 
to their credit scores, several companies, including Fair, Isaac, and Company, Equifax, 
Experian, and Trans Union, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac have voluntarily provided 
general information about the information that is used to calculate a credit score or to 
evaluate a mortgage application, and how that information is generally weighted.  In 
addition, for a fee, consumers can access score simulators that give some approximation 
of the impact of various behaviors on their credit scores.  
 
F.  Inaccurate credit reports 
 
The most fundamental issue connected to credit scoring is the level of accuracy of the 
information that forms the basis for the scores.  Regardless of whether lending and 
pricing decisions are made by a manual or automated review of a consumer’s credit, the 
potential for inaccuracies in credit reports to result in loan denials or higher borrowing 
costs is a cause for concern.  Several organizations have conducted studies and surveys to 
quantify the pervasiveness of credit report errors, with widely ranging findings regarding 
how many credit reports contain errors (from 0.2% to 70%).   
 
A 1998 study by the Public Interest Research Group
5 found that 29% of credit reports 
contained errors that could result in the denial of credit (defined as false delinquencies, or 
reports listing accounts or public records that did not belong to the consumer).  The study 
also found that 41% of reports had incorrect demographic identifying information, and 
20% were missing major credit cards, loans, or mortgages.  In total, 70% of reports 
contained an error of some kind.  This study asked 88 consumers to review their credit 
reports from each of the three major credit repositories for errors.  A total of 133 reports 
were reviewed. 
 
Consumers Union has conducted two surveys of credit reports in which consumers were 
asked to review their credit reports for accuracy.  A 1991 survey
6 found that 20% of 
credit reports contained a major inaccuracy that could affect a consumer’s eligibility for 
credit, and 48% contained inaccurate information of some kind.  In addition, almost half 
of survey respondents found that their reports omitted some of their current accounts.  In 
                                                 
5 Mistakes Do Happen.  Public Interest Research Group.  March, 1998. 
6 “Credit Reports: Getting it Half Right.”  Consumer Reports. July, 1991. p. 453.  
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this survey, 57 consumers reviewed total of 161 reports.  A 2000 survey
7 found that more 
than 50% of credit reports contained inaccuracies with the potential to result in a denial, 
or a higher cost of credit.  The errors included mistaken identities, misapplied charges, 
uncorrected errors, misleading information, and variation between information reported 
by the various credit repositories.  These results reflect the review of 63 reports by 25 
consumers. 
 
A 1992 study conducted by Arthur Andersen
8, commissioned by the Associated Credit 
Bureaus (now known as the Consumer Data Industry Association) used a different 
methodology to conclude that the error rate was much lower.  This study reviewed the 
behavior of 15,703 consumers who were denied credit based on a credit grantor’s scoring 
system.  From this sample, 1,223 consumers (7.8%) requested their credit report from the 
issuing credit repository, and 304 consumers (1.9% of the total sample) disputed the 
information on the report.  Of these, 36 disputes (11.8% of those who disputed, or 0.2% 
of the total sample) resulted in reversals of the original credit denial. 
 
A 1994 study conducted by the National Association of Independent Credit Reporting 
Agencies (now known as the National Credit Reporting Association) represents a third 
approach to the question of credit report accuracy.  Examining a total of 1,710 files, this 
study reviewed a three-repository merged infile (which contains the credit reports from 
all three credit repositories), and conducted a two-repository Residential Mortgage Credit 
Report, or RMCR (in which all conflicting data in the two credit repository reports and 
the application form is verified with each creditor, and a consumer interview is 
conducted) for each file. The results showed missing, duplicated, and outdated 
information in credit files.  Among the three-repository merged infiles: 29% of accounts, 
also known as trade lines or trades (past and current loans, lines of credit, collections, 
etc.), were duplicates, 15% of inquiries were duplicates, 26% of public records were 
duplicates, 19% had outdated trades, and 44% had missing information, such as balance 
or payment information.  Among the RMCRs: 19% had trades added based on 
information from the loan application, 11% had trades added based on investigations, 
16.5% had derogatory information deleted as a result of the investigation, 3% had trades 
removed because they did not belong to the borrower, and 2% had errors in public 
records corrected. 
 
                                                 
7 “Credit Reports: How do potential lenders see you?”  Consumer Reports.  July 2000.  P. 52-3. 
8 Described and cited in Klein, Daniel, and Jason Richner. 1992.  “In Defense of the Credit Bureau.”  Cato 
Journal. Vol 12.  Issue 2.  pp. 393 - 411.  
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IV.  How Does the System Work? 
 
The complex system for reporting and reviewing credit involves a large number of 
participants who fall generally into one of six categories: consumers; data repositories; 
data users; data furnishers; credit reporting agencies; and analytical service providers.  
Approximately 190-200 million consumers have credit reports maintained by the three 
major credit repositories (Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union)
9.  Data users include 
lenders, insurers, landlords, utility companies, and employers, who review the credit 
information in consumers’ credit reports to make decisions about extending and pricing 
credit, offering and pricing insurance policies, and providing utility services, rental 
housing, or offers of employment.  Some, but not all, data users are also data furnishers, 
and regularly report information about consumers’ accounts to the credit repositories, 
who add the information to consumers’ credit reports.  It is the understanding of the 
researchers that there is currently no legal requirement that any business report 
information to any credit bureau, although once a business furnishes data, there may be 
certain obligations that arise in connection with consumer disputes.  In 1996, Congress 
recognized that errors by data furnishers contributed to credit reporting problems, so the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act was amended to impose accuracy duties on data furnishers.  
These duties are generally subject only to administrative enforcement under the FCRA, 
with no private right of action for consumers unless the data furnisher fails to comply 
with re-investigation duties. 
 
Generally, insurers, landlords, utility companies, and employers do not provide positive 
account information to repositories, nor do all lenders.  Also, data enters consumers’ 
records from collection agencies that report on the status of accounts in collection, and 
                                                 
9 Credit repositories attempt to maintain the following information in their databases, but not all data is 
available or provided for every account, and different repositories may collect different levels of 
information, especially consumer identifying information: 
Consumer identifying information (Consumer’s name; social security number; date of birth; former 
names or aliases; current and former addresses; employer; income; position; and employer’s address) 
Public records information (source of information; date recorded; amount of liability; type of record (e.g. 
judgment, tax lien, or bankruptcy); docket number) 
Collections information (collections company’s name; date opened; last date verified or updated by 
collections company; date closed; the amount placed for collection; balance outstanding; name of original 
creditor; the method of payment (a numerical code indicating if the account is current, late, in collection, 
etc.); any remarks) 
Creditor information (creditor’s name; account number; level of responsibility for consumer to pay 
account (primary account holder, joint account, authorized user, etc.); type of loan (revolving, installment, 
mortgage, line of credit, etc.) or collateral for an installment loan; date opened; date of last activity; date 
closed or paid; highest amount ever owed by consumer; the credit limit on the account; the balance due; 
payment size and frequency; any amount past due; date of maximum delinquency; dollar amount of 
maximum delinquency; payment pattern for last 12-24 months (indicating for every month whether the 
account was paid as agreed, or late, and by how many days); the number of months reviewed; number of 
times account was late by 30, 60, or 90 days; the method of payment (a numerical code indicating if the 
account is current, late, in collection, etc.); any remarks) 
Credit Inquiries (list of companies who have requested consumer credit information; date the inquiry was 
made) 
Any consumer statement, such as an explanation of a dispute 
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from repository searches of public records such as bankruptcies, liens, and judgments.  In 
addition, governments may report directly to the repositories if consumers fail to pay 
child support, have unpaid parking tickets, or have been overpaid for unemployment 
benefits.  Credit reporting agencies assist some data users by consolidating information 
from the three credit repositories, and offering services to verify and update information 
in credit reports.  Credit reporting agencies primarily facilitate and support the decision 
making process involved with mortgage underwriting.  Credit reporting agencies and 
credit repositories both provide credit reports to data users, and are considered “consumer 
reporting agencies” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  As consumer reporting 
agencies, these entities share certain obligations, some of which are described below.  
Analytic service providers also help data users interpret the information in consumers’ 
files, and include companies such as Fair, Isaac, and Company, which produces analytical 
tools that generate credit scores, and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who produce tools that help lenders interpret credit 
information in conjunction with mortgage applications.  Some lenders and mortgage 
insurance companies have also created tools that help them interpret credit information 
for mortgage applications. 
 
A.  Non-Mortgage Credit 
 
When a consumer applies for non-mortgage credit, such as a credit card, unsecured line 
of credit, or installment loan (e.g. for an automobile, or furniture), the potential creditor 
(data user) can request a credit report (with or without a credit score) from one, two, or 
three of the credit repositories.  A repository that receives such a request will send the 
credit report to the potential creditor, and record an inquiry on the consumer’s credit 
report.  The creditor can use the information in the credit report to help decide whether to 
extend or deny credit to the consumer, and what the interest rate and other fees will be for 
this credit.  If the creditor accepts the application, they may then act as a data provider, 
and report information on the consumer’s payment history to one, two, or three of the 
credit repositories.  Generally account information can be both positive and negative.  
On-time payments have a positive influence while late payments have a negative 
influence.  However, the amount of positive influence a consumer receives from a timely 
payment may vary based on the type of creditor.  For example, timely payments to a 
prime credit card lender may have a greater positive influence on a score than timely 
payments to a lender considered less favorable, such as a furniture or consumer 
electronics store.  If the creditor denies credit, or offers less than favorable terms, based 
on the credit report or score, federal laws require them to make certain disclosures to the 
consumer, including the name of the consumer reporting agency that supplied the credit 
report and how to contact the agency.  For non-mortgage applications the consumer 
reporting agency is usually a credit repository.  Once given this information, the 
consumer can contact the repository to request a copy of his or her credit report
10.  If the 
                                                 
10 However, the report the consumer receives may differ from the report that the lender reviewed.  If 
consumers submit more comprehensive personal identifiers in their request for a report from the credit 
repository, they may not see the exact report that was used to underwrite their credit application, especially 
if the underwriter made any errors such as misspellings in the consumer’s name or transposing digits in the 
consumer’s social security number, or merely submitted an application with less information about the  
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consumer has suffered an adverse action based on the credit report, the copy must be 
provided by the repository free of charge.  Consumers who have not suffered an adverse 
action can also review their credit reports at any time, but are subject to a fee of 
approximately $9.  Six states (Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
and Vermont) require repositories to provide credit reports to consumers free of charge 
once a year upon request.  Also, if a consumer is receiving welfare, is unemployed, or 
suspects that he or she is a victim of identity theft, the consumer may obtain a credit 
report free of charge.  For an additional charge, the consumer can have a credit score 
computed and included with the credit report under any of these circumstances.  
 
B.  Employment and Services Other Than Loans 
 
When a consumer applies for employment, or for a service that reviews credit histories, 
(such as insurance, an apartment rental, utilities, cell phone accounts) these data users 
may also request and receive a credit report and/or scores from one or more repositories, 
to be used to evaluate the consumer’s application.  Job applicants or employees must 
provide consent before a report is pulled, but other users derive a permissible purpose to 
review credit from the consumer’s act of submitting an application, except in Vermont, 
where oral consent is required to review a credit report for credit uses.   
 
However, while these entities will review credit, and approve or deny the application 
based on the credit report and/or score, they generally do not report positive account 
information back to the credit repositories.  They often, however, indirectly report 
derogatory information by placing accounts for collection.  Accounts that have been 
placed for collection will be reported to one or more of the credit repositories.   
 
C.  Other Data Providers 
 
The reverse is true of collection agencies, which provide information to the repositories, 
but do not use credit data to evaluate consumer creditworthiness, although they may use 
information in credit reports to locate debtors.  Repositories also obtain information by 
requesting it from public records and government entities and when certain government 
entities report directly to the repositories, such as for delinquent child or family support 
payments, unpaid parking tickets, or overpayments of unemployment benefits.  
Information from  collection agencies and public records is primarily derogatory 
information, such as when an account was sent to collection, or a bankruptcy was filed, 
but may also include positive information such as the satisfaction of a bankruptcy or the 
repayment of a collection, and when such repayments occurred.  Because government 
entities do not report information about bankruptcies, liens, civil suits, or judgments to 
repositories, the repositories are responsible for maintaining the accuracy of such public 
record information in credit records, such as whether a bankruptcy has been satisfied or a 
lien has been released.  Any type of collection will have a negative impact on a credit 
history, regardless of whether the debt was related to an account for which a credit report 
was used to establish credit (e.g. for loans or utilities, as well as for child or family 
                                                                                                                                            
consumer’s  identity. While there is no legal prohibition on lenders providing consumers with the actual 
credit report used in their decision-making process, there is likewise no requirement that they provide it.  
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support or parking tickets).  Collections, either from a collection agency or other type of 
account, and public records will continue to have a negative impact after they have been 
paid or otherwise satisfied, although they will have a less negative impact if they are 
satisfied, and will have a less negative impact as time passes. 
 
D.  Mortgage Credit 
 
The process is more complex for a mortgage transaction.  When consumers apply for a 
mortgage, the mortgage lender (who may be a mortgage banker or mortgage broker) has 
a number of options that are influenced by what the lender intends to do with the loan 
after the closing.  The lender can hold onto the loan and collect mortgage payments from 
the consumer until the loan is paid off (known as holding a loan in portfolio), thereby 
assuming all the risk for borrowers defaulting, or the lender can sell the loan to the 
secondary market.  If a loan is sold, the originator loses the access to future profits from 
mortgage payments, but also, so long as the loan meets all the standards set forth by the 
purchaser of the loan, retains no risk should the borrower default.  The originator retains 
the profits from the cost of the mortgage transaction and underwriting, and has a 
replenished supply of capital to make other loans.  The two primary purchasers of loans 
in the secondary market are the government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.  Lenders may also seek a government guarantee for the loan through 
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) 
programs. 
 
1.  Portfolio Loans 
 
If a lender is not planning to sell the loan to the secondary market, that lender will usually 
order a merged credit report, which incorporates information from all three credit 
repositories, including the three credit scores. While a lender will generally use reports 
from all three repositories to underwrite a loan, it may use a single credit report to offer a 
pre-approval.  Also, for second mortgages and lines of credit secured by the home, 
lenders generally underwrite using one credit report.  There is no legal or regulatory 
requirement to use a certain number of credit reports to underwrite a mortgage.  
However, if a lender wishes to sell the loan on the secondary market, or receive an FHA 
or VA guarantee on the loan it may be required to follow certain protocols.   
 
A lender planning to hold a loan in portfolio will order a merged credit report with scores 
from a credit reporting agency, passing on information about the consumer such as name, 
social security number, current and previous addresses.  The credit reporting agency will 
then pass on the request to a merging company, which will request credit reports from all 
three credit repositories and will compile the information from each report returned to 
them, according to their merging logic (a set of automated commands designed to 
identify shared information and present the three reports in a summarized format).  The 
individual credit reports as they read prior to merging and credit scores are also returned 
to credit reporting agency.  The credit reporting agency will then supply this information 
to the lender. 
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Based on the information in this report, and other information such as the applicant’s 
income and the loan to value ratio of the mortgage requested, a lender will decide 
whether or not to originate the loan, and at what price (interest rate, points, etc.).  A 
number of companies, such as mortgage lenders Countrywide and GE Capital and 
mortgage insurers PMI Mortgage Insurance Company and Mortgage Guarantee Insurance 
Corporation, have developed automated underwriting (AU) systems that can provide 
automated evaluations of a loan application based on information from the consumer’s 
credit report and additional information such as income and loan to value ratio.   
 
If the lender is hesitant to originate a loan because of derogatory information in an 
applicant’s credit report, and has reason to believe that it may be incorrect, or outdated, 
the lender can purchase a reinvestigation of the credit information from the credit 
reporting agency. This entails contacting original creditors, collection agencies, and 
government records clerks, to verify and update questionable information contained in 
the merged credit file. These services can mean corroborating as few as one entry in a 
credit file, or it can be a comprehensive review in which every entry with conflicting 
information is corroborated.  An alternative called a Residential Mortgage Credit Report 
(RMCR) involves reviewing two or three credit repository reports, verifying all 
conflicting data in the credit repository reports and the application form with each 
creditor, updating any account with a balance over 90 days old, conducting a consumer 
interview, and other verification services.  Such services provide more current 
information to a lender for their consideration when underwriting a mortgage, but they do 
not alter information maintained by any of the credit repositories, nor do they change a 
borrower’s credit score
11. A credit reporting agency may have greater success obtaining 
clarification of inconsistencies in an applicant’s record than the applicant would have 
acting on his or her own, and the credit reporting agency’s reinvestigation is more likely 
to be trusted by the lender than the word of a consumer regarding current status of 
accounts.  This service adds cost to the credit underwriting process (roughly $50-100).  
For consumers who have credit scores far higher than the requirements to qualify, this 
would be an unnecessary service.  However, for those who face loan denial, or 
dramatically higher borrowing costs because of errors in their reports, the savings over 
the life of the loan, or in some cases with a single mortgage payment, could more than 
compensate for the increased cost of this reinvestigation.  After the reinvestigation, the 
credit reporting agency will provide the updated and verified information to a lender who 
can consider the information while making the final underwriting decision
12.   
 
                                                 
11 When a reinvestigation produces changes in the information contained in a repository’s credit report, the 
credit reporting agency is required to pass the information on to the repository within 30 days.  However, 
once this occurs, there is no requirement that the repository update the consumer’s credit file, nor a time 
frame within which they must respond.  It would be far better for consumers if the credit repositories were 
under an obligation to update the consumer’s file, or at the very least to respond with the results of their 
own reinvestigation within 30 days.  In the mean time, the disputed information should be part of the credit 
report provided to any data users who request the file as the reinvestigation is underway. 
12 Lenders are not required to accept the results of a reinvestigation, and the automated underwriting 
systems of key secondary market actors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not.  Instead they require all 
changes to be made through a process known as rescoring, described in greater detail below.  
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2.  Loans Sold in the Secondary Market 
 
In the current marketplace, few loans are held in portfolio, especially those loans 
originated by brokers.  Instead, many are sold into the secondary market to entities that 
bundle large numbers of mortgages into securities that are sold to investors – a process 
known as securitization. The major actors in this part of the market are the Government 
Sponsored Enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, although a number of large national 
lenders also purchase and securitize loans.  If mortgage originators can sell a loan, then 
they will have renewed capital to make another loan, and will still have profit derived 
from the costs charged to the consumer for the transaction.  Thus selling a loan into the 
secondary market is an attractive option.   
 
Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have both 
developed automated underwriting systems which evaluate mortgage applications based 
on the information in credit reports, as well as additional information such as income and 
loan to value ratio, in a very short amount of time.  Lenders can submit a loan application 
to these automated underwriting systems prior to approving a loan and receive an 
indication from the GSE that they will purchase the loan.  Each GSE has a different 
protocol for submitting loan applications and for obtaining and using credit histories. 
 
Automated underwriting (AU) systems do not approve or deny loans, but can provide an 
indication of whether a GSE will purchase the loan, and thereby assume the risk of 
default with respect to the loan.  A lender can override an AU decision and underwrite 
the loan manually, but if they do so, they must agree to buy back the loan if it defaults 
and is found to have violated the purchaser’s loan standards.  While a loan with an AU 
approval that meets all the purchaser’s standards and complies with the warranties of sale 
carries no risk for a lender or broker, a loan that has been approved by overriding AU 
standards does carry significant risk.  Many loans are still manually underwritten, but the 
majority of applications are reviewed with an automated underwriting system, and this 
share is expected to grow in coming years. 
 
Brokers are the dominant originators of loans, but they do not have the financial reserves 
of banks, thrifts, and other financial institutions.  They rely on being able to sell their 
loans almost immediately. This is much more difficult without an AU approval.  Also, 
the efficiencies of credit scoring and automated underwriting have made the loan 
approval process so fast for loans with good credit that the additional effort required to 
correct errors, or otherwise revisit the details of the loan file, acts as a substantial 
deterrent to mortgage lenders working on these loans.  In this market, where record 
volumes of loans are being originated, there is a tremendous incentive to deal only with 
the loans that will be approved the fastest – the loans that pass the credit score/ automated 
underwriting test
13.  
                                                 
13 The economic pressure on originators to underwrite loans that will require the least amount of work 
existed prior to the introduction of automated underwriting systems.  However, the development of 
automated underwriting has made the process so quick for some loans that the relative additional time 
required to complete a more complicated loan is proportionally greater.  Some have noted that decreasing  
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3.  Credit Rescoring 
 
If lenders wish to update or correct information in a credit report, the lender cannot use 
the reinvestigation process for portfolio loans outlined above and resubmit the loan 
through the automated underwriting systems of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The 
reinvestigation process outlined above does not change the data on record at the 
repositories and only reports that contain credit scores and have been generated at the 
repository level are acceptable for submission to Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
automated underwriting systems.  Lenders can choose to manually underwrite the loan 
and submit it with documentation of the errors in the first credit report. 
 
If a lender is unwilling to underwrite the loan manually, and a consumer can afford to 
wait several weeks, the consumer can submit a dispute directly to the credit repository, 
and the repository has 30 days to respond to the dispute.  However, if the borrower 
wishes to correct an error in an expedited time frame, lenders who submit loans through 
automatic underwriting systems would have to order a service known as rescoring. In this 
process, the credit reporting agency will obtain the necessary documentation regarding 
the disputed account or accounts and contact the rescoring department within the relevant 
repository. This department will verify the information provided to them by the credit 
reporting agency, either through spot checks, or by verification of every update, within a 
few days.  After this process is complete, a new credit report with new credit scores can 
be requested, and the loan can be underwritten with the more current information.  In 
addition, the information is changed at the repository level, and will be reflected in future 
credit reports for this consumer.  This has recently become a very expensive service for a 
lender to purchase.  Since the summer, two of the three repositories have increased prices 
for this service by as much as 400%
14.   
 
Regardless of how the underwriting takes place, if the loan is originated, the mortgage 
lender, or the entity holding and servicing the loan if it is sold, may become a data 
provider.  The servicer will report information about consumer’s payment behavior 
related to their mortgage to one, two, or three of the credit repositories, who will add this 
information to the credit report. 
                                                                                                                                            
the time required to underwrite the easiest loans potentially frees underwriters to devote more time to more 
difficult loans. 
14 According to reports from a number of credit reporting agencies, Transunion and Equifax have recently 
changed their pricing.  Transunion previously charged $5.00 per account entry, or trade line, regardless of 
whether the account to be updated was a joint or individual account.  As of June of this year, Transunion 
charges $20 per trade line to update an individual account, and $25 to update a joint account.  Equifax has 
recently increased the cost from approximately $5 per rescore to $15 per tradeline for a joint or individual 
account, or $30 for a same day request.  Both repositories have clearly stated that these costs are not to be 
passed on to the consumer.   It is also of note that these two repositories compete with credit reporting 
agencies in offering rescoring services, and charge between $8-10 per trade line to lenders who contact 
them directly.   
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4.  Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Department of Veterans’ 
Affairs (VA) Loans 
 
Lenders who wish to submit loans for an FHA or VA guarantee must also follow certain 
protocols regarding the submission of credit reports, but have a number of options to 
choose from.  For example, the FHA program accepts either a three repository merged 
credit report, a Residential Mortgage Credit Report (RMCR), or applications processed 
through the automated underwriting systems of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The 
RMCR option is required to be made available to consumers who dispute information 
contained in their credit reports
15.  In addition to the options offered to lenders submitting 
loans for FHA guarantees, the VA program accepts applications processed through the 




                                                 
15 See FHA Lender’s Handbook number 4155.1 chapter 2, section 4 “Credit Report Requirements,” and 
Mortgagee Letters 98-14 and 99-26, available at www.hudclips.org. 
16 See VA Lender’s Handbook, VA Pamphlet 26-7, available at http://www.homeloans.va.gov/26-7.pdf.  
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V.  Study Design 
 
A.  Phase One 
 
The first phase of the study consisted of a manual review of 1704 credit files, archived by 
credit reporting agencies. These files had been requested by mortgage lenders on behalf 
of consumers actively seeking mortgages.  The three credit reporting agencies that 
generated these files are located in different regions of the county (West, Midwest, and 
East) and serve mortgage lenders in a total of 22 states.   
 
Only archived credit files that had been generated by mortgage lender requests for reports 
and scores from all three major credit repositories (Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union) 
were included in the review.  Files were included in the study by reviewing consecutive 
archived files dating from June 17
 to June 20, 2002
17.  
 
Ensuring the anonymity of all data collected and examined for this study was a 
paramount concern for both CFA and NCRA.  The data collection procedures were 
designed with particular care to ensure that no personal identifying information from 
these credit files was recorded for this study.  No reports were provided in paper or 
electronic form, and no names, social security numbers, account numbers, addresses, or 
other consumer identifying information was recorded.  All comments regarding 
inconsistencies were recorded in generic form.  For example, the fact that digits in a 
social security number were transposed in one file would have been recorded, but the 
actual number would not have been.  Similarly, if a consumer’s file showed apparent 
confusion between credit data recorded under a consumer’s first name and credit 
recorded under the consumer’s middle name, this would have been noted, but the names 
would not have been recorded.  While the files were being reviewed, the National Credit 
Reporting Association (NCRA) and the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) took 
precautions to limit the access to identifying information to the credit reporting agencies’ 
representatives, who worked with a representative from the Consumer Federation of 
America in each office.  The credit reporting agency representative retrieved the files, 
and conveyed only the relevant generic information verbally to the CFA representative  
for recording.  As a result, the data examined for this study contains only generic 
information about variations in credit data, but does not link that data to any consumer or 
consumers.   
 
For each file, the credit scores from each of the three major credit repositories were 
recorded.  If a repository returned a report, but the report was not scored, or if the 
repository could not locate a report for the applicant, this information was also recorded.  
In addition, researchers noted if a file contained multiple reports from any repository, and 
recorded the scores for these reports, if the report was scored.  Residential Mortgage 
Credit Reports (RMCRs), for which credit reporting agencies verify and update 
                                                 
17 For agencies that serve multiple time zones, additional measures were employed to include records from 
consumers in all regions.  For example, every second file from one agency was reviewed rather than every 
file.  
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information in the credit report, were identified as such
18.  For joint application files, the 
applicant’s and coapplicant’s reports were treated as separate reports.  Approximately 
500 files that contained a credit score from each of the three repositories were recorded at 
each agency. 
 
A major focus of the study was for those applicants closest to the boundary between the 
lower priced prime mortgage lending market and the higher priced subprime mortgage 
lending market, which, in addition to higher costs overall, exposes borrowers to greater 
risks of predatory lending.  A large variance between scores on a consumer’s file is a 
likely indication of drastically incomplete and/or incorrect information in that consumer’s 
credit reports, and a cause for concern.  For those closest to the boundary between prime 
and subprime, generally considered to be a credit score of 620, the impact of even small 
variances can be severe and translate directly into a greater financial burden. 
 
Thus, more detailed information about each file was recorded: 1) if the file had widely 
varying scores among repositories (defined as a range of 50 points or greater between the 
high and low score); 2) if the file was near the threshold between prime and subprime 
classification with a substantial variance between scores (defined as having a middle 
score between 575 and 630, and a range between high and low scores greater than 30 
points); or 3) if the file was directly at the threshold between prime and subprime 
classification (defined as having a high score above 620, and a low score below 620).  
For files that met these criteria, the four primary factors contributing to the credit score, 
provided by each repository as part of the credit report, were recorded.   
 
Finally, if the file met criterion 2 (had a middle score between 575 and 630, and a range 
between high and low scores greater than 30 points), or if the file had a variation in 
scores of more than 90 points, the specifics of the three credit reports were reviewed in an 
attempt to identify any obvious inconsistencies between the repositories.  When possible, 
researchers made a determination based on this review of whether any inconsistencies 
seemed likely to be artificially lowering or raising the score reported by one or more 
repositories.  
 
B.  Phase Two 
 
The goal of Phase Two was to test the representational validity of the findings in Phase 
One by comparing key statistics from that sample of credit files with the same statistics 
for a much larger sample of credit files.  Specifically, the goal was to compare the range 
among credit scores, and the frequency of explanations provided to consumers.   
 
This phase of the study reviewed credit scores and the explanations for those scores 
provided by the repositories for a separate sample of 502,623 archived credit files. This 
larger sample was collected electronically and did not involve a manual review of each 
file.  As with the first phase, these files had been requested by mortgage lenders on behalf 
of consumers actively seeking mortgages, and only credit files generated by a request for 
                                                 
18 Conducting and RMCR does not affect the credit scores, and when in depth reviews of the reports were 
conducted on RMCRs, the comments referred to the status of the report prior to updates or verification.  
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the reports and scores from all three major credit repositories (Experian, Equifax, and 
Trans Union) were included.   
 
If a repository returned an unscored report, or if the repository could not locate a report 
for the applicant, this information was recorded.  In addition, the presence of multiple 
reports from any repository and the scores for these reports, if scored, were recorded.  For 
joint application files, the applicant’s and coapplicant’s reports were treated as separate 
reports.   
 
For this phase of the study, the zip code for each file was recorded, as was information 
about the type of services requested for each file, and the version of the scoring model 
used to calculate each score.  By matching zip codes with states, it was possible to 
determine the geography represented by these files.  Phase Two analyzed files from every 
state and territory in the nation, with a wide distribution of files from all regions.  (34% 
from the Northeast, 27% from the Southeast, 30% from the Midwest, 6% from the 
West
19, 4% with no zip code information to indicate a state, and 0.08% from U.S. 
territories.)   
 
Unlike the files in Phase One, which constitute a snapshot of the profile of consumers 
seeking mortgage credit over just several days, the files reviewed in Phase Two date from 
December 8, 2000 to September 20, 2002. 
 
C.  Phase Three 
 
Phase Three explored the prevalence of specific errors in a representative sample of 
credit reports, and attempted to quantify how many files contained inconsistent, missing, 
or duplicated information.  Researchers used a 10% sample of all files reviewed at one 
site in Phase One  and reviewed account data and public records data for errors of 
omission (information not reported by all repositories) and errors of commission 
(inconsistent information between repositories, or duplicated information on a single 
repository).   
 
This phase tabulated how many consumer files were missing accounts on at least one 
repository report that appeared on other repository reports, treating accounts of different 
type and status separately.  The same criteria used to tabulate missing accounts were used 
to tabulate the number of files that contained duplicate reports of accounts on a single 
repository report. 
 
                                                 
19 The researchers were concerned that there were disproportionately fewer files from the western region, 
particularly a disproportionately low number of files from California. However, subsequent analysis 
showed that key statistics and distribution of score ranges for the files from this region, and from California 
specifically, were virtually identical to those for the entire sample.  Therefore, the researchers are confident 
that this under-representation is not introducing any bias into the findings.  (The regions were defined as 
follows Northeast: ME, NH, VT, NY, MA, CT, RI, PA, NJ, DE, DC, MD, WV, VA.  Southeast: NC, SC, 
GA, TN, KY, AL, MS, FL, LA, AR, TX, OK.  Midwest: OH, IN, IL, MI, WI, MN, ND, SD, IA, MO, NE, 
KS.  West: AZ, NM, MT, WY, CO, UT, NV, CA, ID, OR, WA, AK, HI.  Territories: GU, PR, VI.)  
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The seven types of accounts identified were mortgages, other installment loans, revolving 
accounts, other accounts not in collection, medical collections, child support collections, 
and other collections or charge offs.  The researchers differentiated between the status of 
each non-collection account on the repository or repositories that did report the account.  
For accounts other than collections and charge offs (mortgages, other installment loans, 
revolving accounts, other accounts not in collection), the researchers differentiated 
between accounts that had no derogatory information, accounts that had late payments, 
accounts that had conflicting information regarding late payments on two repositories, 
and accounts that had inconsistent information regarding default.  In addition, researchers 
noted if a mortgage had gone to foreclosure, and if a revolving account had been reported 
lost or stolen.  
 
Files with duplicate or missing public records were tabulated, differentiating by type and 
status as well.  Researchers tabulated missing and duplicate bankruptcy filings, liens, 
judgments, and civil suit filings, differentiating between two categories of status, those 
that had been filed, and those that had been recorded as released, satisfied, dismissed, or 
paid. 
 
In addition to determining the number of files with missing and duplicate accounts, the 
researchers tabulated the number of files that contained certain inconsistencies between 
the three repositories regarding account details for accounts reported by all three.  The 
inconsistencies of interest were: the number of payments recorded as 30 days late; the 
number of payments recorded as 60 days late; the number of payments recorded as 90 
days late; the balance reported on revolving accounts or accounts in collection; the credit 
limit reported on revolving accounts; the past due amount; the method of payment (a 
code indicating if the account is currently being paid as agreed, is currently late, was late, 
but is now paid, etc.); the date of last activity on defaulted accounts; and the type of 
account.  Finally, the researchers tabulated the number of files that reported a defaulted 
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VI. Findings 
 
A.  Phase One 
 
1.  Almost One in Ten Files was Missing a Credit Score from at Least 
One Repository. 
 
Of the 1704 unique files reviewed, 1545 files had at least one score reported from each 
major credit repository.  The remaining 159 reports were excluded from the statistical 
analysis because of one or more missing scores.  Table 1 details the status of the files 
included and excluded from the analysis. 
 
2.  A Substantial Number of Files Met the Criteria for Further Review.   
 
Of those 1545 files that had valid scores from each repository, 591 files, or 38%, were 
flagged for further review, based on the three predefined criteria outlined in the previous 
section and below.   
 
Of the 1545 valid files: 
1.  453 files, or 29%, had a range of 50 points or more between the highest and 
lowest scores.  
2.  175 files, or 11%, had a middle score between 575 and 630 and had a range of 30 
points or more between the highest and lowest scores. 
3.  250 files, or 16%, had high scores above 620 and low scores below 620. 
 
These numbers do not total 591 because many files met multiple criteria.  Table 2 
provides more detail on the number of files that met each of the criteria.  
 
Table 1. Status of Files Reviewed in Phase One.
1390 Files with exactly 3 repositories scored, with no additional scores or unscored reports
114 Files with 3 repositories scored but with additional scores and unscored reports
41 Files with 3 repositories scored but with additional unscored reports
1545 Subtotal: number of files with 3 bureau scores -- included in analysis
58 Files with only 2 repositories scored*
26 Files with only 1 repository scored*
62 Files with no repositories scored*
13 Duplicate files, test files, or other errors that were thrown out
159 Subtotal: number of files excluded from analysis
1704 Total Files Reviewed
* Unscored files include cases where no file was returned (no hit on information input during request) as well 
as cases for which a file was returned but not scored. 
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3.  Numerous Files Contained Additional Repository Reports and 
Information not Relevant to the Consumer’s Credit History. 
 
Each file examined had been generated from a request for a merged file that included one 
report and one score from each repository.  However, one in ten files (155 out of 1545) 
contained at least one, but as many as three, additional repository reports.  These reports 
were not duplicate copies of reports, nor were they residual reports from previous 
applications for credit.  These additional reports were returned from the same 
simultaneous request that produced the other reports in the file.  For 114 of the files with 
additional reports, at least one, but as many as three of these additional reports also 
contained a credit score.  It was unclear to researchers exactly how various systems 
would interpret these additional repository reports. 
 
In some cases, an additional repository report was clearly reporting the credit activity of a 
separate person (no accounts from the additional report appeared on the three primary 
reports, and vice versa).  However, it was very common for the additional report to 
contain a mixture of credit information, some of which belonged to the applicant and 
some of which clearly did not.  In some cases, applicants had split files that appeared to 
be the result of applying for credit under variations of their name.   
 
Common reasons for returning additional repository reports included: 
?  Confusion between generations with the same name (Jr., Sr., II, III, etc.). 
?  Mixed files with similar names, but different social security numbers. 
?  Mixed files with matching social security numbers, but different names. 
?  Mixed files that listed accounts recorded under the applicant’s name, but with the 
social security number of the co-applicant. 
?  Name variations that appeared to contain transposed first and middle names. 
?  Files that appeared to be tracking credit under an applicant’s nickname. 
?  Spelling errors in the name. 
?  Transposing digits in the social security number. 
?  An account reporting the consumer as deceased. 
Table 2.  Number of Files that met Criteria for Further Review in Phase One
Met Criterion 1 453
          Met Criterion 1 only 273
          Met Criteria 1 and 2 only 29
          Met Criteria 1 and 3 only 79
          Met all three Criteria 72
Met Criterion 2 175
          Met Criterion 2 only 39
          Met Criteria 1 and 2 only 29
          Met Criteria 2 and 3 only 35
          Met all three Criteria 72
Met Criterion 3 250
          Met Criterion 3 only 64
          Met Criteria 3 and 1 only 79
          Met Criteria 3 and 2 only 35
          Met all three Criteria 72
Met any of the three Criteria 591 
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4.  Scores Reported by the Three Repositories for a Given Consumer 
Varied Substantially.   
 
The review found considerable variability among scores returned by the three credit 
repositories.  Because the repositories all use the scoring model provided by Fair, Isaac, 
and Company, this considerable variability among scores suggests considerable 
differences in the information maintained by each repository.  Fair, Isaac, and Company 
attribute variations in credit scores to variations in credit data
20.  However, some have 
suggested that variations in credit scores may be occurring because not all data users are 
adopting new versions of the scoring model simultaneously.  Researchers explored this 
concern using the data collected for Phase Two, and found the impact of different scoring 
models to be negligible. 
 
Only one out of five files (328, or 21%) could be considered extremely consistent, with a 
range of fewer than 20 points between the highest and lowest scores.  One in three files 
(475, or 31%) had a range of 50 points or greater between scores, and one in twenty files 
(81, or 5%) had a range of 100 points or greater between scores.   
 
The average (mean) range between highest and lowest scores was 43 points, and the 




Files with good and bad credit both appear susceptible to large point ranges, although 
consumers with poor credit may be slightly more susceptible.  Chart 1 compares the 
middle score of all files with the range between the highest and the lowest score for that 
file.  The middle score is often the score used for loan approval. On this chart there is 
slight correlation between middle score and score variability.  The regression trendline, 
which in this case estimates the average score range for each middle score, is relatively 
flat, but is higher for files with worse overall credit.  This means that, on average, files 
with low middle scores have slightly greater variability among their scores, relative to 
files with high middle scores.  
 
For example, for a middle score of 550, the regression line has a value of 50, meaning 
that the average range between high and low scores for files with a middle score of 550 is 
50 points.  In comparison, the average range between high and low scores for files with a 
middle score of 700 is 40 points.  Thus, files with a middle score that is 150 points lower 
have an average score variability that is 10 points greater. 
                                                 
20 Fair Isaac, and Company address the question of differing information at the three repositories as part of 
the explanation of how credit scoring works on their consumer oriented website, myFICO.com, stating: 
“Your score may be different at each of the three main credit reporting agencies: The FICO score from 
each credit reporting agency considers only the data in your credit report at that agency.  If your current 
scores from the three credit reporting agencies are different, it’s probably because the information those 
agencies have on you differs.” (http://www.myfico.com/myfico/CreditCentral/ScoringWorks.asp)  
21 In the Eastern region, the mean range was 40 and the median range was 33.  In the Midwestern region, 
the mean range was 43 and the median range was 36.  In the Western region, the mean range was 46 and 
the median range was 38.  




5.  Reports Contained Limited Information to Help Consumers 
Understand the Principal Reasons for their Credit Scores.  
 
If a consumer is subject to an adverse action because of information in a credit report, 
federal laws (the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act) require 
the lender to make certain disclosures.  Adverse actions include, among other things, 
denial of credit, or denial of favorable terms on credit.  The required disclosures include 
statements that an adverse action has occurred and that the decision was based in part or 
entirely on a credit report and the specific, principal reasons for the adverse action 
(generally four reasons are given)
22.   
 
Thus, each repository report contains the four principal reasons contributing to the score 
returned, as identified by the automated process that calculated the score.    The three 
repositories have approximately forty standard reasons that can be provided through this 
process.  However, a mere four reasons were provided as the primary contributing reason 
on 82% of the reports reviewed (i.e. the reports in the 591 files that met any of the criteria 
for further review outlined in the study design). The four most frequently returned 
explanations for a consumer’s score, with the frequency with which they occurred, were: 
 
                                                 
22 National Consumer Law Center, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fourth Edition. 2000. 
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?  “Serious delinquency, and derogatory public record or collection filed” (37% of 
all explanations). 
?  “Serious delinquency” (20% of all explanations). 
?  “Proportion of balances to credit limits is too high on bank revolving or other 
revolving accounts” (15% of all explanations). 
?  “Derogatory public record or collection filed” (10% of all explanations). 
 
It is important to note that three of the explanations (“Serious delinquency,” “Derogatory 
public record or collection filed,” and “Serious delinquency, and derogatory public record 
or collection filed”) convey at least partially redundant information.  These three 
explanations alone constituted 67% of all primary reasons provided. 
 
6.  In Depth Reviews Revealed Significant Errors and Inconsistencies, 
Some of Which were Likely Artificially Lowering Consumer Credit 
Scores, and Some of Which were Likely Artificially Raising Consumer 
Credit Scores. 
 
In depth reviews were done of files that met the second criterion for further review (had a 
middle score between 575 and 630 and a range between high and low score of more than 
30 points), or if the file had a range between scores of more than 90 points.  In each case, 
researchers attempted to identify any obvious inconsistencies between the account level 
data on each of the repository reports, determine whether these inconsistencies were the 
result of omissions, or if they reflected conflicting credit data, and make a determination 
of whether the scores were likely being artificially inflated or artificially deflated by these 
inconsistencies. 
 
There are obvious limitations to what the researchers could conclude during in depth 
reviews of credit file details without the aid of either creditors or consumers to 
corroborate or contest inconsistencies.  The researchers attempted to approach these 
evaluations in as conservative a manner as possible; for example when derogatory 
information, such as a collection, was reported on only one repository, researchers tended 
to assume that the derogatory information was correct.  However, when finer details were 
inconsistent, such as the current payment status of a given account, the more recent 
information was usually assumed to be correct.  In total, 258 files were reviewed in 
depth. 
 
For approximately half of the files reviewed in depth (146 files, or 57%), researchers 
were unable to identify clearly whether inconsistencies in the reports were resulting in an 
artificially higher or artificially lower score.  In many cases this was because there were 
large numbers of derogatory accounts, reported in various combinations by one, two, or 
three of the credit repositories.  For those files for which a determination was made, an 
even split existed between files for which one or two scores were likely artificially high 
(56 files, or 22%) and files for which one or two scores were likely artificially low (56 
files, or 22%).  Thus, at least one in five at risk borrowers, but likely many more, are 
likely being penalized because of an inaccurate credit report or credit score.  Similarly, at 
least one in five at risk borrowers is likely benefiting from inflated scores because of  
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incomplete credit information. However, these figures are based on the assumption that, 
in the absence of contradictory information, all information that was reported by only one 
repository was accurate. The figures likely underestimate the actual number of borrowers 
who are at risk because they do not account for information that is simply incorrect, does 
not belong to the borrower, or has been contested and removed from one or two 
repositories, but not from all three. 
 
While this finding suggests a certain statistical equilibrium between the harm and benefit 
that obvious omissions, mistakes, and inconsistencies may be causing to consumers on 
the macro level, credit scores are purported to offer consumer-specific evaluations, and 
are used to generate customer-specific prices and decisions.  Lenders suffer little harm so 
long as there is such statistical equilibrium because the large number of consumers they 
serve allows them to benefit from the countervailing impact of these errors on a given 
pool of loans.  Consumers, on the other hand, have one score for every purchase, and do 
not benefit from such statistical averaging. Given the number of decisions regarding 
access and pricing of essential services that rely on these scores, their determination 
should not be a lottery in which some consumers “win” because derogatory information 
is omitted while other consumers “lose” because erroneous, contradictory, outdated, or 
duplicated information is reported in their credit history.  Rather, scores should be 
determined fairly and based on complete, current, and accurate information.  
 
B.  Phase Two 
 
The second phase of the study examined the scores and primary factors contributing to 
the score, as identified by the repositories, from 502,623 files compiled from electronic 
records.  Examining this very large sample allowed for a corroboration of some of the 
findings of Phase One among a larger population, roughly equivalent to a 0.25% sample, 
or one out of every 400 consumers with credit reports.  Furthermore, because no details 
of the report were recorded beyond the credit scores and primary reasons for the scores, 
zip code data could be included without fear of recording excessive personal identifying 
information. This allowed for verification that the sample had broad geographical 
representation. 
 
1.  Scores Reported by the Three Repositories for a Given Consumer 
Varied Substantially. 
 
The key findings from Phase Two are very similar to the findings from Phase One. Just 
fewer than one out of four files (105,324 files, or 24%, compared to 21% in Phase One) 
could be considered extremely consistent, with a range of 20 points or fewer between the 
highest and lowest scores.  One in three files (129,284 files, or 29%, compared to 31% in 
Phase One) had a range of 50 points or greater between scores, and one in twenty-five 
files (17,626 files, or 4%, compared to 5% in Phase One) had a range of 100 points or 
greater between scores.   
 
The average (mean) range between high and low score was 41 (compared to 43 in Phase 
One).  The median range between high and low score was 35 (compared to 36 in Phase  
  26 
One).  Chart 2 is a histogram showing the share of files for which the range between 
highest and lowest score fell into 10 point bands up to 150, and the number of files for 
which the range exceeded 150.   
 
 
2.  Reports Scored With Different Versions of Scoring Software Reflected 
Almost No Difference in Overall Variability of Credit Scores. 
 
As mentioned in the findings for Phase One, some have suggested that score variability 
can be explained by the fact that different versions of the Fair, Isaac, and Company 
scoring software may be in use in the marketplace as data users transition to a new 
version.  The data collected in Phase Two allowed researchers to assess this and 
determine that the fact that reports were scored with different versions of the scoring 
models did not have an impact on the overall variability of credit scores in this study.   
 
Fair, Isaac, and Company produces the software for all three repositories, but each 
repository refers to the scoring software by a different name.  When Experian adopts a 
new version of the software, they discontinue the previous version (for example when 
they switched from a version Experian referred to as “Fair Isaac” to a version Experian 
referred to as “Experian/Fair Isaac Risk Model”), but users of Trans Union and Equifax 
software must update to the newest software version themselves, and there can be more 
than one version of the software in use at a given time.  The sample examined in Phase 
Two reflected the use of two different versions of scoring software to score reports from 
Trans Union and Equifax.  Trans Union reports were scored by an older version titled 
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“Empirica” and a newer version titled “New Empirica.”  Equifax reports were scored by 
an older version titled “Beacon” and a newer version titled “Beacon 96
23.”  
 
The use of different scoring models had a nearly imperceptible effect on variation among 
scores.  Only three combinations of scoring models occurred in the sample.  Reports 
scored with the two older versions, “Empirica” and “Beacon,” had an average range 
between the highest and lowest credit score of 39.61 points, and a median range of 33 
points.  Reports scored with “Empirica” and “Beacon 96” had an average range of 40.85 
points, and a median range of 34 points.  Reports scored with “New Empirica” and 
“Beacon 96” had an average range of 41.59 points, and a median range of 36 points.  
Comparing these statistics to the overall statistics for Phase Two (an average range of 41 
points and median range of 35 points) shows that the influence of different scoring 
models is negligible, and if anything, the newer models resulted in a slightly greater 
variation among scores. 
 
Recent commentary suggests that a new version of the software, “Next Generation 
FICO,” which Equifax will refer to as “Pinnacle,” Trans Union will refer to as 
“Precision” and Experian will refer to as “Experian/ Fair Isaac Advanced Risk Score,” 
may produce significantly different scores from earlier models, but has not been widely 
adopted in the marketplace
24.  The impact of this new scoring tool is deserving of 
attention.  However, none of the reports in this analysis were scored with this version of 
the scoring software. 
 
3.  Reports Contained Limited Information to Help Consumers 
Understand the Principal Reasons for their Credit Scores. 
 
As in Phase One, a very limited number of standardized responses represented the vast 
majority of all explanations provided to consumers about their credit scores.  The same 
four explanations that were predominant in Phase One were predominant in Phase Two, 
but in Phase Two a fifth code was returned with significant frequency. 
 
Three explanations (“Serious delinquency,” “Derogatory public record or collection 
filed,” and “Serious delinquency, and derogatory public record or collection filed”) 
represented 50% of the primary explanations provided (compared to 67% in Phase One).  
The explanation “Proportion of balances to credit limits is too high on bank revolving or 
other revolving accounts” represented 18% of the primary explanations provided 
(compared to 15% in Phase One).  While these explanations constituted a very large 
share of all the principal explanations (7 out of 10), a fifth explanation also constituted a 
significant share.  The explanation “Length of time accounts have been established” 
represented 8% of all the primary explanations provided (compared to 5% in Phase One). 
                                                 
23 In addition, 0.3% of files scored by TransUnion were scored by a version titled “Horizon,” 
approximately 6% of files scored by all three repositories did not identify the version of the software used 
for scoring, and an extremely small number of files (approximately 0.03%) were scored by a non-mortgage 
model, such as an auto model or a bankruptcy model. 
24 Harney, Ken. “Get Upgraded Credit Scoring,” Washington Post, November 23, 2002, and “Lenders Slow 
to Adopt New FICO Scoring Model,” Washington Post, November 30, 2002.  
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It is worth noting that the four principal reasons for credit scores were on every file 
included in the analysis in Phase Two, while Phase One only recorded the explanations 
for those that met the criteria for further review. 
 
C.  Phase Three – Specific Types of Errors 
 
The dramatic ranges between credit scores uncovered in Phases One and Two seem to 
indicate wide ranging inconsistencies between the information on each repository for a 
given consumer.  Phase Three attempted to quantify how many consumer files contain 
errors, and of what kind.  Errors of omission (information not being reported by all 
repositories) and errors of commission (inconsistent information between repositories, or 
duplicated information on a single repository) were both considered. Researchers 
recorded how many consumer files contained at least one of each category of errors 
identified.   
 
Phase Three re-examined a 10% randomly selected sample of the files reviewed at one of 
the sites from Phase One.  In this sample of 51 three-repository merge files, errors of 
omission and commission were both rampant.  Table 3 lists the categories of errors, the 
number of files that contained such errors, and the percentage of files that contained such 
errors. 
 
This examination of the frequency with which certain errors occur is not intended to 
imply that the occurrence of any one of these errors alone will necessarily reclassify a 
consumer into a more expensive pricing class.  The actual impact of any one of these 
errors will depend upon what other information exists in the consumer’s credit report.  
Any error with the potential to lower a consumer’s credit score will generally have a 
greater effect on “thinner” files, or files that have less information.  Also, if a report has 
no derogatory entries, the first piece of derogatory information will very likely have a 
more severe negative impact on a consumer’s apparent creditworthiness than the same 
information would have on a file with multiple derogatory entries.  However, it is 
possible for a single derogatory entry to have a dramatic effect on a consumer’s score, 
whether or not it is accurate.  If that consumer is near the threshold for a less favorable 
pricing class, it is very possible and probable that an error or errors in that consumer’s 
credit history could have a substantial material impact.  Furthermore, most reports 
reviewed contained more than a single error, and the cumulative effect of multiple errors 
increases the likelihood of material impact on consumers. 
 
The sample size in Phase Three is the smallest of the three phases, due primarily to the 
time required to review files in sufficient depth to identify specific errors.  The 
researchers recognize that the statistics from this phase have limitations and it is difficult 
to make definitive statements about the frequencies with which specific errors occur in 
the population at large based on these findings.  However, this phase does document 
strikingly high levels of errors and provides evidence that at the very least a significant 
minority in the general population are at risk for a variety of errors of commission and 
omission.   
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Table 3.  Types of Errors, and Number and Percentage of Files Containing Such Errors

























































































































































































































Mortgage No Derogatory Info 17 33.3% 1 2.0%
Mortgage Late Payments 1 2.0% 0.0%
Mortgage Inconsistent Lates btw Repositories 1 2.0% 0.0%
Mortgage Inconsistent, one shows Default 0.0% 0.0%
Mortgage Foreclosure 2 3.9% 1 2.0%
Other Installment  No Derogatory Info 34 66.7% 4 7.8%
Other Installment  Late Payments 3 5.9% 0.0%
Other Installment  Inconsistent Lates btw Repositories 2 3.9% 1 2.0%
Other Installment  Inconsistent, one shows Default 1 2.0% 0.0%
Revolving No Derogatory Info 40 78.4% 9 17.6%
Revolving Late Payments 6 11.8% 0.0%
Revolving Inconsistent Lates 2 3.9% 0.0%
Revolving Inconsistent, one shows Default 4 7.8% 0.0%
Revolving Missing Lost or Stolen 8 15.7% 0.0%
Other   No Derogatory Info 8 15.7% 1 2.0%
Other   Late Payments 0.0% 0.0%
Other   Inconsistent Lates btw Repositories 0.0% 0.0%
Other   Inconsistent, one shows Default 0.0% 0.0%
Collection Medical Collection/ Chargeoff 10 19.6% 0.0%
Collection Child 
Support Collection/ Chargeoff 1 2.0% 0.0%
Other Collection or 
Chargeoff  Collection/ Chargeoff 13 25.5% 3 5.9%
Bankruptcy Filed 0.0% 0.0%
Bankruptcy Released/Satisfied/Dismissed/Paid 5 9.8% 1 2.0%
Lien Filed 4 7.8% 0.0%
Lien Released/Satisfied/Dismissed/Paid 2 3.9% 0.0%
Judgement Filed 3 5.9% 0.0%
Judgement Released/Satisfied/Dismissed/Paid 2 3.9% 0.0%
Civil Suit Filed 0.0% 0.0%
Civil Suit Dismissed 1 2.0% 0.0%
# 30 Late 22 43.1%
# 60 Late 15 29.4%
# 90 Late 12 23.5%
Balance on Revolving Accts or 
Collections 42 82.4%
Credit Limit on Revolving Accts 49 96.1%
Past Due Amount 9 17.6%
Current Method of Payment 31 60.8%
Type of Account 11 21.6%
Last Activity on Defaulted 13 25.5%
No Last Activity Date on defaulted 
accounts 11 21.6%
Omission Commission  
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1.  Significance and Frequency of Errors of Omission 
 
Incomplete reporting of information, or an error of omission, can make a consumer 
appear either more credit worthy or less credit worthy, depending on the nature of the 
information that is omitted.  When a derogatory account, such as a collection, late 
payment, charge off, or public record is omitted, the consumer’s record will appear less 
risky, and the consumer’s credit score will likely be artificially high.  However, when a 
positive account, such as a mortgage, auto loan, or credit card account that has been paid 
as agreed, is omitted, this responsible credit behavior will not be conveyed and the 
consumer’s credit score will likely be artificially low.   
 
Positive account information is especially important for consumers who are just 
beginning to establish credit, or who are working to re-establish their credit rating after 
bankruptcy. Omitting positive information can have a dramatically negative impact on 
such consumers.  Failure to report positive accounts can deflate scores, or even make it 
impossible for the scoring model to produce a score.  Such outcomes make it more 
difficult to enter or return to the prime lending marketplace, relegating affected 
consumers to the higher priced subprime market. 
 
Because of the limitations of the study, researchers were unable to determine definitively 
whether many of these errors were errors of omission.  For example, researchers could 
not be certain that accounts appearing on one report only were the result of omissions by 
the other two repositories, or if the accounts appeared as the result of merging errors, or 
compiling errors on that one repository (and actually did not belong to the consumer), or 
if they had been contested and removed from some repositories but not removed from all 
three.  In the absence of evidence that presented a contradiction, researchers 
conservatively treated information appearing only on one or two repositories as an error 
of omission. 
 
a)  More Files Contained Omissions of Positive Information than 
Contained Omissions of Derogatory Information, but Omissions of 
All Kinds were Common.  
 
Accounts that had never been late, and which have great significance for determining a 
credit score, were omitted with extremely high frequency.  Omitted revolving accounts 
with no derogatory information were noted on the largest number of consumer files.  
Nearly eight out of ten files (78.4%) were missing a revolving account in good standing.  
In addition, one file out of three (33.3%) was missing a mortgage account that had never 
been late, and two files out of three (66.7%) were missing another type of installment 
account that had never been paid late.  Other accounts with no derogatory information, 
such as non-revolving credit cards, were missing on 15.7% of all files. 
 
Omissions of accounts with late payments, but which had not been sent to collection, 
were less frequent than omissions of positive accounts.  Still, one in ten files (11.8%),  
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was missing a revolving account with late payments reported, and many (7.8%) were 
missing revolving accounts that were being reported as defaulted by one of the two 
repositories that reported the account.  Half that number (3.9%) contained conflicting 
information about late payments on revolving accounts reported by two repositories.  A 
much smaller number of files were missing mortgages or installment accounts that had 
been late at some time in the past, or that had conflicting information regarding late 
payments, but 3.9% of files omitted a foreclosure.   
 
The most commonly omitted derogatory information was for various types of collections.  
Child support collection omissions were rare (2% of files), but one out of five files 
(19.6%) omitted a medical collection, and one out of four files (25.5%) omitted a 
collection of some other kind.  
 
b)  Medical Collections Raise Special Concerns Regarding 
Appropriateness and Privacy. 
 
Medical collections, as a subset of collections that were often not reported on all three 
repositories, deserve special attention.  Disputes between consumers, health insurance 
companies, and medical care providers occur frequently, and can be of extended duration.  
Many medical bills are referred to collection agencies during these disputes but are 
ultimately paid by insurers.  Therefore, if all the relevant facts were known these 
collections could very likely be errors of commission, rather than errors of omission, as 
they may not accurately reflect consumer debt repayment behavior.   
 
Another issue noted by researchers related to medical collections was the high degree of 
information that can be inferred from the information in medical collection entries listed 
on a consumer’s credit report.  The names of many medical creditors are specific enough 
to allow for identification of categories of treatment.  For example, information in 
collection entries identified categories of medicine, such as perinatology, and neonatal 
health clinics.  This could have especially significant ramifications if full credit reports 
are reviewed by potential and current employers, who may infer from such collections 
that an applicant, or employee, has an unusually sick newborn, and may be more likely to 
be called away from the office
25.  In other cases, consumers may simply wish not to have 
the fact that they have sought treatment for other very private matters (such as treatments 
for fertility, mental health, or AIDS) to be readily discernible by anyone who reviews 
their credit record.   
 
Section 604 (g) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act states that “A consumer reporting 
agency shall not furnish for employment purposes, or in connection with a credit or 
insurance transaction, a consumer report that contains medical information about a 
consumer, unless the consumer consents to the furnishing of the report.”  However, 
consumers have complained about the difficulty of identifying the original creditors for 
collection accounts that appear on their files, and best practices have been proposed by 
                                                 
25 It is the researchers’ understanding that current market practices do not permit employers to view the 
same level of detail that is provided to potential lenders.  Employer credit reports generally do not contain 
the notations on collection entries that would allow them to make such medical inferences.    
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the Consumer Data Industry Association that attempt to strike a balance between 
protecting consumers’ medical information and providing enough information to allow 
consumers to identify the original source of debts.  Furthermore, it is the Researchers’ 
understanding that in Massachusetts, the original creditor must be listed for every 
collection account.   
 
c)  Public Record Information was Frequently Omitted, Including 
Both Information that Would Likely Increase Credit Scores and 
Information that Would Likely Decrease Scores.   
 
One in ten files had an omitted date of fulfillment for a bankruptcy, an omission that 
almost certainly lowered the corresponding credit scores.  Several files also contained 
reports that omitted liens, both satisfied (3.9%) and unsatisfied (7.8%), and judgments, 
both satisfied (3.9%) and unsatisfied (5.9%).  One file contained a dismissed civil law 
suit that was reported to one repository only. 
 
Given the dramatic frequency of omissions of both positive information (such as 
mortgages) and derogatory information (such as collections and public records) it is clear 
that errors of omission have the potential to undermine the accuracy of consumer credit 
records and, by extension, credit scores.  It should be noted that true errors of omission 
(excluding unrelated account information that is erroneously captured by one repository 
and disputes which have not resulted in removal of information from all three 
repositories) are most likely the fault of the creditor, not the credit repository.  If a data 
provider, be it a collection agency or major national bank credit card, decides not to 
report information to all three repositories, then the repositories do not know the 
information and cannot report it. 
 
2.  Errors of Commission 
 
Also of great concern to consumers is the frequency with which errors of commission, or 
inclusion of incorrect information, occur in credit reports.  A credit report with incorrect 
derogatory information makes a consumer appear to be a greater lending risk and will 
likely artificially lower the consumer’s credit score.  In addition, duplicate reporting of 
accounts can have an impact on a consumer’s scores.   
 
Again, because the researchers did not have the benefit of knowing the consumers’ credit 
histories, we were limited in the errors of commission that we could identify.  Only in 
cases where repositories were reporting conflicting details on an account could 
researchers identify with certainty that at least one repository was incorrect.  Even with 
these limitations, the findings are troubling. 
 
a)  Many Consumer Files Contained Conflicting Information 
Regarding the Consumer’s Record of Late Payments.   
 
In 43.1% of the files, reports regarding the same accounts conflicted regarding how often 
the consumer had been late by 30 days.  In nearly one out of three cases (29.4%), there  
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was conflicting information about how many times the consumer had been 60 days late, 
and conflicting information regarding the number of times an account had gone to 90 
days late in one out of four consumer files (23.5%).  Late payments, especially on recent 
accounts, can be very detrimental to a consumer’s credit score.  Delinquencies are 
identified as major contributing reasons for a consumer’s score on the majority of reports.   
 
In some cases, but by no means in all, different numbers of late payments may be the 
result of the timing of record updating procedures by the repositories. For example, one 
repository may have information on an account that is current as of June, whereas another 
repository may only have received or loaded information current as of May.  However, 
this phenomenon would only explain variations for accounts that are currently past due, 
and not for the significant number of files that were currently reported as paid on time, 
but had discrepancies in the historical count of late payments.  Furthermore, regardless of 
a repository’s particular timing, a consumer will be evaluated on the information 
available at the time of application. 
 
b)  Reporting of Account Balances was Inconsistent 
 
Inconsistencies regarding the balance on revolving accounts or collections appeared on 
82.4% of files, and inconsistencies regarding an account’s credit limit appeared on 96.1% 
of files.  These particular numbers are presented with one qualification.  The software 
used to review reports presents information in a field titled “credit limit/high credit.”  
Researchers acknowledge that the raw data may contain separate information regarding 
the high credit (the highest amount ever charged on this account) and the credit limit (the 
amount of credit made available by the creditor) and the observations regarding 
inaccuracies in these fields may not reflect the data used to derive credit scores.  
However, even with this qualification, there are reasons to be concerned about incorrect 
reporting of balances or credit limits.  Credit card lenders have an incentive to obscure 
the real credit limit from credit reports, as a means of retaining existing borrowers.  If a 
credit card lender reports a credit limit as lower than the actual limit (for example by 
reporting the high credit as the credit limit) the borrower will appear to be closer to 
“maxing-out” their credit, and will appear less attractive to competing credit card lenders.  
Thus, the consumer will be less likely to receive competing offers.  Such misreporting 
also poses a significant risk to consumers’ overall credit rating.  The practice of 
deliberately refusing to report complete and accurate account information in order 
obscure consumers’ credit has drawn repeated condemnation from John Hawke, the 
Comptroller of the Currency
26.  There is good reason to be concerned, given that one of 
                                                 
26 In a May 5, 1999 speech before Neighborhood Housing Services of New York, Hawke stated, “Subprime 
loans can’t become a vehicle for upward mobility if creditors in the broader credit market lack access to 
consumer credit history.  Yet, a growing number of subprime lenders have adopted a policy of refusing to 
report credit line and loan payment information to the credit bureaus – without letting borrowers know 
about it.  Some make no bones about their motives: good customers that pay subprime rates are too 
valuable to lose to their competitors.  So they try to keep the identity and history of these customers a 
closely guarded secret” (http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99-41a.doc).  He reiterated these concerns in 
a June 9, 1999 speech before the Consumer Bankers Association, condemning the objectionable practice of 
non-reporting and noting that, “failure to report may not be explicitly illegal.  But it can readily be  
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the most frequently provided explanations for a consumer’s credit score is that the 
“proportion of balances to credit limits is too high on bank revolving or other revolving 
accounts.”  This is the primary explanation listed on approximately one out of six reports. 
 
c)  Contradictory or Missing Dates Occurred Frequently and Have 
the Potential to Distort a Consumer’s Record. 
 
Because more recent credit activity is more influential in determining a credit score, it is 
important that the relevant dates on accounts be accurate.  This is primarily true for 
accounts that have gone into default.  Creditors track the date of last activity on consumer 
accounts, but, because most creditors report to repositories in large batches of data on 
many accounts, credit repositories also track a second date – the last date the information 
was reported by the data provider.  If a data provider fails to report any information in the 
date of last activity data field, the scoring software will assume that the date last reported 
is the date of last activity.  Thus, if a consumer has an account that defaulted several 
years ago, but otherwise has good credit, under normal circumstances the relative impact 
of this account will diminish over time.  However, if there is no date of last activity 
reported, this default will seem perpetually as recent as the last submission of a batch of 
data from that provider.  One in five consumer files (21.6%) contained a defaulted 
account that did not report a date of last activity.  One in four files (25.5%) contained 
contradictory information regarding the date of last activity. 
 
d)  Duplicate Reporting of Accounts did not Appear to be as 
Widespread as Many of the Other Errors Noted in this 
Investigation.   
 
When accounts were reported multiple times by a single credit repository, they tended to 
be accounts that had no derogatory information, which may provide an artificial boost to 
a consumer’s credit scores by giving the impression that the consumer has successfully 
managed more credit than he or she actually has, but may also lower a consumer’s credit 
score by increasing their apparent overall debt load.  Also, on 5.9% of files a collection 
was reported more than once on a single credit report, likely artificially lowering the 
score.  This was usually the result of a collection being reported by the original creditor 
as well as a collection agency that had taken over the account. 
 
Further contradictions existed regarding the method of payment (whether an account was 
current, late, charged off, in collection, etc.) on 60.8% of files, the type of account 
(revolving, installment, mortgage) on 21.6% of files, and the past due amount on 17.6% 
of files.   
 
3.  Merging and Compilation Errors  
 
Credit data are complex, and accurate interpretation of it can sometimes take a 
considerable amount of time and effort.  When credit reporting agencies and credit users 
                                                                                                                                            
characterized as unfair; it may well be deceptive, and – in any context – it’s abusive” 
(http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/99-51a.doc).  
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review merged reports, they employ software to help organize and simplify the 
information, so the user can quickly assess the unique information contained in each 
repository without having to sift through the same information reported by another 
repository.  The design of a tool to do such work involves making certain choices, which 
can lead to significantly different results.  For example, some merging software is 
designed to present the details for a given account from one of the three repositories to a 
credit user, and “hide” the other two repositories reports.  Other software utilizes a 
merging logic that takes some information from each repository report to create an 
amalgam of the information in each credit report.  This one example of a design decision 
can result in a very different presentation of the same raw data to a credit reporting 
agency or credit user.   
 
The discussion of duplicate and mixed files in Phase One already illustrated that a large 
number of errors enter the credit reporting system when the automated software used by 
the credit repositories compiles information about credit users.   Use of nicknames, 
misspellings, transposed social security numbers, and mixed files that report information 
under one person’s name, but match that name to a spouse’s social security number, are 
all examples of variations that can result from an automated interpretation of complex 
and sometimes contradictory personal identifying data.  Software designers must make 
explicit choices about how to interpret this data, and what form the output will take.  For 
one in ten files, the result was an additional repository report and/or an additional credit 
score.   
 
A similar potential for error exists when automated systems interpret multiple reports, 
merging the three credit reports into a single representative report. This process attempts 
to reconcile the voluminous inconsistencies between repositories for account level 
information.  Given the difficulties that are apparent from the attempts to reconcile 
individual consumer information, the importance of ensuring a fair and rigorous merging 
logic for any compilation software is clear.    
 
These concerns raise many questions.  How exactly does a software program that collects 
information from multiple credit repositories interpret conflicting or duplicated 
information?  How much variation can a given software package consider before an 
account entry is treated as a separate account?  How many creditors are trying to game 
the marketplace by not reporting complete or accurate information about consumers – in 
effect making consumers appear less creditworthy than they actually are to other potential 
creditors, in a bid to protect their customer base?   
 
We do not raise these problems to advocate an end to use of multiple repository reports.  
In fact, use of multiple credit scores serves as a control against errors of omission.  (All 
of the errors of omission identified in this study were identified because of the use of 
multiple repository reports.)  On the contrary, we identify these problems to illustrate that 
there are difficult choices that must be made when developing all of the components of 
the interconnected system that evaluates credit.  Given the lack of oversight of this 
dimension of the market, there is a very real potential for developers to make choices that  
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result in a system that is unfair to consumers in general or to a certain segment of 
consumers, such as those nearest the threshold between prime and subprime.   
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VII.  Conclusions and Implications of the Findings for Consumers 
 
A.  Credit scores and the information in credit reports vary significantly among 
repositories. 
 
The scores based on data from the three repositories can vary dramatically for all 
consumers regardless of whether they have generally good or bad credit histories.  
Approximately one out of every three files (31%) had a range of 50 points or greater, and 
one out of twenty reports had a range of 100 points or greater (5%).  The average range 
between high and low scores was 43 points (median range was 36).  
 
The wide range in credit scores reflects a similarly broad variation in the data contained 
in each repository report for a given consumer.  Significant accounts, such as mortgages, 
credit cards, collections, and public records, were regularly omitted from one or more 
credit repository reports.  In addition, for most consumers, the details of accounts that are 
reported by all three repositories are unlikely to be completely consistent.  Information 
about late payments, the balance and credit limit on revolving accounts, and the current 
status of accounts are among errors that occur frequently. 
 
B.  Many consumers are unharmed by these variations, and some probably 
benefit from them. 
 
Consumers with very good credit histories, whose credit scores place them firmly above 
the cutoff for the most the favorable product terms, are as likely as any other consumer to 
have variation between credit scores.  However, as long as that variation does not result 
in scores that are lower than the qualifying score for the best terms for credit, insurance, 
or any other product or service underwritten by their credit score, there will be no 
material harm.  The number of consumers in this category is somewhat unclear and 
depends upon the products being sought and the qualifying scores for those products.   
 
Furthermore, those near the boundary between pricing ranges, such as the division 
between the prime and subprime mortgage markets, who have errors that artificially raise 
their scores may be artificially classified as lower risk.  As a result, such consumers have 
the potential to reap some benefit from the inconsistencies. 
 
C.  However, tens of millions of consumers are at risk of being penalized for 
incorrect information in their credit report, in the form of increased costs or 
decreased access to credit and vital services.  
 
We estimate that tens of millions of consumers are at risk of being penalized by 
inaccurate credit report information and incorrect credit scores. Between 190 and 200 
million Americans, or nearly every adult consumer, has a credit report that can be scored 
to produce a credit score.  Businesses from mortgage lenders to utility providers 
increasingly have established pricing structures in which the charge for the loan or 
service corresponds to a credit score range.  Errors in credit reports that lower a 
consumer’s credit score can place that consumer into a more expensive pricing range than  
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he or she deserves to be in.  Credit scores below a certain cutoff point can even disqualify 
consumers outright. 
 
Looking at the mortgage market as an example, the two most significant ranges are 
defined by a credit score of 620.  Whether a consumer’s credit score is above 620 or 
below 620 determines if the consumer qualifies for
27 the lower priced prime market, or if 
the consumer will be limited to subprime market, which imposes higher borrowing costs, 
often requires larger down payments, and exposes consumers to abusive predatory 
lending practices.  In addition to this primary division in the prime and subprime 
mortgage markets, there are secondary pricing ranges.  According to the consumer 
focused website of Fair, Isaac, and Company (www.myfico.com), consumers with a score 
between 720 and 850 will qualify for the lowest interest rates, but there are at least four 
different pricing ranges in the prime market and at least two in the subprime market.  
Consumers with a score between 700 and 719 will be charged higher borrowing costs 
than those in the highest score range.  Prices similarly increase for scores between 675 
and 699, and between 620 and 674.  Within the subprime market, the two pricing ranges 
identified by Fair, Isaac, and Company are from 560 to 619 and from 500 to 559. 
 
This study focused on consumers at risk for misclassification into the subprime market 
due to inaccurate information in their credit report and found that one in five consumers 
(20.5%) is at risk. We have defined at risk consumers as either having a middle credit 
score between 575 and 630 with a score variance of greater than 30 points, or as having a 
high score above 620 and a low score below 620.  Among these at risk consumers, based 
on our analysis of files, we estimate that at least one in five (22%) is likely being 
penalized with lower scores than deserved because of errors or inconsistencies in his or 
her credit report that are clear enough to be noticed by an outside observer unfamiliar 
with that consumer’s debt payment history.  (We also estimate that at least one in five 
(22%) has scores that are likely too high due to a lack of reporting by creditors to all 
repositories.)  The remaining sixty percent of at risk consumers have credit reports 
without errors clear enough to allow an outside observer to determine whether their credit 
scores are artificially low or artificially high.  We strongly suspect that a significant share 
of these at risk consumers also have artificially low credit scores due to errors in their 
reports that they would be able to identify if given the opportunity.   
 
While the findings suggest that there may be some statistical equilibrium between those 
consumers who have artificially high scores and those who have artificially low scores, 
such statistical averaging is irrelevant to the individual consumer who is penalized based 
on errors in his or her credit report.  Credit scores are purported to offer consumer 
specific evaluations of credit and do result in consumers specific decisions regarding 
pricing and availability for the essentials of daily life and economic activity. 
 
Consumers may be harmed by both errors of commission and errors of omission.  Errors 
of commission can lower a consumer’s score in situations such as when incorrect 
                                                 
27 Because of the aggressive sales tactics of subprime and predatory lenders, many consumers who have 
credit scores above 620 have subprime loans, although they could have qualified for less expensive prime 
loans.  This is an important but separate issue.   
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information or mixed files add the credit history of others to a consumer’s report.  Errors 
of omission can lower a consumer’s score when the record does not contain full and 
accurate information regarding existing accounts paid as agreed. 
 
Those consumers on the threshold of subprime status face particularly dire consequences 
from this lack of precision.  Falling below the cutoff score for a prime rate mortgage can 
add a tremendous financial burden to these threshold consumers and make it more 
difficult to meet this and other financial obligations.  Interest rates on loans with an “A-” 
designation, the designation for subprime loans just below prime cutoff, can be more than 
3.25% higher than prime loans.  Thus, over the life of a 30 year, $150,000 mortgage
28, a 
borrower who is incorrectly placed into a 9.84% “A-” loan would pay $317,516.53 in 
interest, compared to $193,450.30 in interest payments if that borrower obtained a 6.56% 
prime loan – a difference of $124,066.23 in interest payments
29. 
 
We conservatively estimate that 40 million consumers (twenty percent of the 200 million 
with credit reports) are at risk of being misclassified into the subprime mortgage market, 
and at least 8 million (twenty percent of these at risk consumers) would be misclassified 
as subprime upon application, but the actual numbers are likely much higher.  These 
numbers do not even attempt to quantify the number of consumers who are being 
overcharged because errors pushed them into a higher pricing range within the prime or 
subprime markets.  Furthermore, consumers with errors in their credit reports and 
artificially low credit scores are penalized in a number of markets in addition to the 
mortgage market.  These figures do not address the consumers penalized with higher 
credit card interest rates, more expensive insurance, or those denied insurance, housing, 
utility service, or employment (an application of credit scoring we expect to increase in 
frequency) on the basis of erroneous credit scores.   
 
D.  Almost one in ten consumers runs the risk of being excluded from the credit 
marketplace altogether because of incomplete records, duplicate reports, and 
mixed files. 
 
If a consumer has very little credit history, or is rebuilding credit after a bankruptcy, 
every positive account that they can establish is vital for creating a record that has 
sufficient information to be scored.  If a lender requests scores for a consumer, but a 
repository is unable to return a score (as was the case for approximately one out of ten 
files reviewed in this study), that lender may choose to set aside the customer’s 
application and focus on an application with enough credit to be scored and priced with 
minimal work.  This is especially likely during periods of heavy volume, such as the 
prolonged refinancing boom currently occurring.  Even if a lender later returns to the file 
that was set aside once volumes have subsided (perhaps because of seasonal fluctuations 
in home buying activity, or because interest rates have risen), the consumer will have 
suffered substantial harm by being excluded even temporarily from the marketplace.  
                                                 
28 The Federal Housing Finance Board’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey reports that the national average loan 
amount for conventional home purchase loans closed during June of 2001 was $151,000. 
29 Interest rates as reported by Inside B & C Lending for 30 year Fixed Rate Mortgages for “A-” Credit (par 
pricing), and “A” Credit respectively, as of July 14.  
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Consumers may not understand the implications of incomplete reporting or non-reporting 
by their creditors, and would have little leverage to force their creditors to report up to 
date information anyway.   
 
Similarly, consumers generally have no control over the inclusion in their credit files of 
duplicate reports, or mixed information not belonging to them.  The only person in a 
position to tell if a credit repository’s compilation system incorrectly groups unconnected 
information with a consumer, or to assess why their credit record was not scored, is the 
lender.  But there is no requirement that the lender share the report or score with the 
consumer.  Furthermore, if the lender incorrectly enters the identifying information, 
during a credit review, either leaving out information such as social security number, 
generation (Jr., Sr., etc.), or mistyping the applicant’s name or other information, the 
lender may be contributing to the problem.  If a consumer later requests a copy of his or 
her credit file after denial, he or she will often be required to provide more 
comprehensive information than the original data user.  This means that the report 
eventually provided to the consumer may have a lower propensity of errors than the 
version used to evaluate his or her application.  This is especially true for non-mortgage 
credit, or mortgage credit underwritten with files ordered directly from one or more credit 
repositories.  If a mortgage lender ordered a merged credit report from a credit reporting 
agency that merged the files into a new report, and after being denied the borrower 
requests a copy of the credit report from that agency, the agency has an obligation to give 
the consumer the merged credit report. 
 
The treatment of unscored files is a very serious question.  How do automated credit 
reviews treat files that contain extra scores, or extra reports that are unscored?  One in ten 
requests fails to return a score from each repository.  As many requests return one score 
from each repository, but also return additional files that may or may not be scored.  If 
automated credit reviews reject additional files, as many as two in ten consumers could 
be excluded from the credit market outright because of these problems. 
 
E.  The use of information from all three repositories in mortgage lending 
protects consumers and creditors from being negatively affected by errors of 
omission, but it may increase the negative impact on consumers of errors of 
commission.   
 
The use of information from all three repositories on mortgage underwriting offers 
consumers and creditors protection against errors of omission by introducing the 
maximum available information to the scoring and underwriting process.  However, 
errors of commission actually occur on more files than do errors of omission, and there 
are a number of different approaches to using information from three repositories for 
underwriting purposes.  Without a chance for borrowers to review their reports for errors 
of commission at the time of underwriting, and without oversight of how the information 
is merged and presented, the use of multiple repository sources of data can produce a 
result that is harmful to consumers.   
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F.  Consumers are not given useful and timely information about their credit. 
 
1.  Standardized, generic explanations do not provide sufficient 
information for consumers to address inconsistencies and contradictions, 
let alone outright errors. 
 
Approximately 7 in 10 credit reports indicated that the primary factor contributing to the 
score was “serious delinquency, derogatory public record, or collection filed,” or some 
subset or combination of these factors, without providing any information about which 
specific accounts were responsible for the low scores.  In many cases, it is not even clear 
whether a delinquency, public record, or collection was responsible for the score.   In 
addition approximately one in six reports indicated that the primary reason for the score 
was that the proportion of revolving balances to revolving credit limits was too high.  
These two relatively generic explanations were reported as the primary reason for a 
derogatory score on more than 8 out of 10 reports reviewed.   
 
The vague information provided by these explanations is too general to be helpful. Nearly 
all consumers near the subprime border have had some activity in their past that may fall 
under the broad terminology “serious delinquency, derogatory public record, or collection 
filed,” almost by definition.  If their credit records were more favorable, they would not 
be so close to the subprime threshold.  Such borrowers may accept this generic 
justification for a low score more readily than consumers with generally good credit.  
Thus, the consumers who are most likely to be penalized by errors are the least likely to 
challenge these imprecise explanations. Because threshold consumers are not provided 
the specific account information that is lowering their scores, they are not given the tools 
to identify and correct possible errors.  The situation would likely be different if 
consumers had access to the full credit reports and scores used to underwrite their loan 
applications, with an indication of which accounts had the largest negative effect on their 
scores.  If this were the case, consumers would have a much more legitimate opportunity 
to identify and challenge any errors.   
 
The credit report is a rare type of consumer product.  Consumers pay for it during 
mortgage underwriting, and are rewarded or penalized on the basis of it, but are not even 
allowed to look at it, much less keep a copy for their records.  Furthermore, consumers 
can understandably view the report as “theirs” because it is purportedly a record of their 
behavior. 
 
2.  Consumers outside of California have no affirmative right to know 
their credit scores. 
 
Credit scoring is a shorthand that allows lenders to more quickly assess the complex 
information in a consumer credit report.  However, with the exception of California 
residents, consumers are not guaranteed access to their credit scores, although they are 
permitted to purchase copies of the underlying data. Thus, consumers are placed at a 
disadvantage relative to lenders when it comes to evaluating their own credit-worthiness.  
When Californians gained access to their scores, many lenders across the country did  
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begin making the scores available.  As with the specific credit report used to evaluate an 
application, consumers are charged for the additional cost of obtaining a credit score for 
underwriting, but have no guarantee that they will be able to view the specific score used 
to underwrite their loan.  Currently, all three repositories allow consumers to purchase 
scores in conjunction with credit reports, but prior to the passage of the California law 
requiring this, the repositories resisted providing scores to consumers. 
 
G.  Private companies without significant oversight are setting, or at the very 
least heavily influencing, the rules of the marketplace for essential consumer 
services that base decisions on credit scores. 
 
Companies, such as Fair, Isaac, and Company, have produced credit scoring software that 
is increasingly used in the marketplace to determine access and pricing for the essentials 
of daily life and economic activity.  Consumers have no choice regarding how lenders or 
other data users evaluate their credit, and widespread and increasing use of credit scoring 
systems that evaluate applications for credit, mortgages, insurance, tenancy and even 
employment is a fact of the marketplace.  Scoring systems incorporate many complex 
decisions regarding the interpretation and treatment of information that can be 
contradictory, incomplete, duplicative, or erroneous.  There is great potential for these 
systems to incorporate inappropriate decisions that result in consumer harm, especially as 
models originally designed to evaluate credit applications are adapted to evaluate 
applications for services completely unrelated to credit behavior. 
 
Despite the tremendous and growing influence of automated credit evaluations, no 
government entity has recognized and acted on the clear need for ongoing, timely review 
of these software systems to determine their accuracy, fairness and appropriate 
application.  Many decision-makers who use scoring systems to evaluate consumer 
applications do not even understand the systems themselves and cannot explain them to 
consumers.  Thus, while decision-makers are increasingly relying on programs that they 
do not understand, no public entity is guaranteeing the validity and fairness of such 
programs.  Without independent review and oversight of this market force, consumers 
are, literally, left to the devices of the system developers.  
 
H.  Certain information in credit reports has the potential to cause breaches of 
consumers’ medical privacy.   
 
Many credit report entries regarding medical collections contained enough information to 
infer medical details about consumers, such as the type of treatment they had received.  
The ability to discern from a credit report that a consumer may have received treatment 
from a neonatal clinic, a fertility clinic, a mental health provider, or an AIDS clinic has 
serious implications for medical privacy, and could potentially facilitate discriminatory 
treatment.  While section 604 (g) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits furnishing of 
medical data in connection with employment, credit, or insurance transactions, 
consumers also complain that reporting collection accounts without identifying the 
original creditor makes it difficult for consumers to decipher their own reports.  It is the 
understanding of researchers that current market practices limit the level of detail in  
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reports provided to employers, aggregating information in such a way that individual 
creditors are not identified, and an employer would be unlikely to be able to make 
specific inferences about an applicant’s or employee’s medical condition.  Nonetheless, 
the presence of this information among the data held at the repository level is troubling 
and deserving of further attention. 
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VIII.  How to Improve the System 
 
 
A.  Require creditors to immediately provide to any consumer who experiences an 
adverse action as a result of their credit reports or credit scores a copy of the 
credit reports and scores used to arrive at that decision free of charge and permit 
disputes to be immediately resubmitted for reconsideration. 
 
All consumers who experience an adverse action based on one or more credit reports or 
scores (such as having a loan or insurance application denied, being charged higher than 
prime rates, or receiving less favorable terms) should immediately be given a copy of 
both the full report or reports used to derive that score and the related credit scores 
without having to pay any additional fee.  These reports should identify any entries that 
are lowering the consumer’s score and indicate the impact (either the point value 
deducted for that entry or the proportional impact of that entry relative to other 
derogatory entries in the report).  The consumer should then be allowed to identify any 
errors or out of date information, provide documentation, and be reevaluated for prime 
rates.   
 
The additional cost to lenders and businesses of providing these reports immediately 
would be minimal.  Since they already posses the report in paper or electronic form, they 
would merely have to copy or print this report. 
 
Simply providing consumers with the name and contact information of the consumer 
reporting agency or agencies that provided the information used to arrive at the decision 
is insufficient because it creates an unnecessary obstacle and, especially for non-
mortgage applications, the report a consumer will receive after submitting a request may 
very likely differ from the report the creditor reviewed.  Errors from duplicate scores 
and/or mixed reports that may result from incomplete or incorrect keying of information 
during the file request will not be apparent if the consumer correctly requests his or her 
file.  One in ten consumer applications results in an additional report being returned by 
the repository. 
 
B.  Require decisions based on a single repository’s credit report or credit score 
that result in anything less than the most favorable pricing to immediately trigger 
a re-evaluation based on all three repositories at no additional cost.   
 
Lenders and other credit data users have a desire to keep their underwriting costs low.  
This is a legitimate desire so long as consumers are not harmed in the process.  Some 
reduce costs by underwriting certain decisions with only one credit report.  For example, 
a lender may offer pre-approval letters based on only one report, or underwrite home 
equity lines of credit or second mortgages with a single report.  Given the wide range 
between scores for a typical consumer and the frequency with which major accounts are 
omitted from credit reports, such practices have serious negative implications for 
consumers.    
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Measures should be put in place to protect consumers from any negative impact resulting 
from such underwriting practices.  A simple solution would be to require all decisions 
based on credit to use information from all three repositories.  However, this could result 
in higher costs and reduced availability of products such as pre-approval letters that are 
beneficial to consumers. 
 
Alternatively, lenders and other credit data users could be permitted to continue 
underwriting based on one report, so long as any adverse impact based on information 
from a single repository immediately triggers a re-evaluation with information from all 
three repositories at no additional cost to the consumer.  In this manner, businesses could 
continue to save on underwriting costs for consumers with very good credit, but 
consumers with less than perfect credit would not be forced to continue to pay a high 
price for inaccuracies, inconsistencies, or incompleteness on any one credit report.  
 
C.  Strengthen requirements for complete and accurate reporting of account 
information to credit repositories, and maintenance of consumer data by the 
repositories, with adequate oversight and penalties for non-compliance. 
 
Many errors in credit reports can be attributed to the practices of creditors and other 
credit data users rather than to repositories.  For example, some data furnishers may not 
report to every credit bureau.  Others may consciously misreport or omit information 
regarding an account in order to prevent other lenders from approaching a valuable 
customer with competing offers (such as credit card lenders not reporting the true 
available credit amount so that the borrower appears to have a much higher debt-to-
available credit ratio and appears to pose greater risk when other lenders review the credit 
report).   Appropriate government entities such as the Federal Trade Commission and 
federal banking regulators should require accurate and complete reporting of credit 
information to the repositories by any entity that uses credit data to make evaluations and 
conduct regular examinations for compliance.  In addition to scrutinizing reporting 
entities, a government entity (such as the Federal Trade Commission) should audit the 
repositories’ records on a regular basis to identify data furnishers who report incomplete 
or incorrect information to the repositories.  Such activity should be subject to fines or 
other penalties for non-compliance.  These audits should also assess the overall accuracy 
of data maintained by the credit repositories, with appropriate fines or other penalties for 
inaccuracy. 
 
Some may perceive tension between consumers’ interest in keeping their information 
private and their interest in having evaluations of their creditworthiness be based on an 
accurate record of their past behavior.  However, consumers generally object to 
information sharing for secondary purposes, not in the regulated Fair Credit Reporting 
Act context, provided it is subject to Fair Information Practices.  The cost of incorrect 
information is high, and it is possible to simultaneously serve both consumer interests 
reasonably well. 
 
Not all providers of consumer services use credit records or credit scores to determine 
consumer eligibility, or pricing.  However, those that do should be required to complete  
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the cycle of information and report complete and accurate information back to the credit 
repositories.  Information about any account that was underwritten with a report from one 
or more credit repositories should be reported to those repositories as frequently as the 
consumer is obligated to make payments.  Collection agencies should be required to 
report on the status of collections at least once every six months.   
 
D.  Establish meaningful oversight of the development of credit scoring systems. 
 
Despite the fact that consumer access to, and pricing for, vital services such as 
mortgages, general consumer credit, insurance, rental housing, and utilities is 
increasingly dictated by the automated evaluation of credit, there is no government 
oversight of the design of these systems.  The calculations behind credit scores, a fact of 
life for the American consumer, remain shrouded in secrecy.   
 
The design of credit scoring systems involves a number of deliberate choices that can 
have a dramatic impact on consumers and can result in systems that are flawed or unfair.  
These choices can range from determining the relative impact of various consumer 
actions to establishing the system defaults for cases where information such as date of 
last activity is not reported, to designing the logic for interpreting public records or 
contradictory information reported for an account. 
 
A wide variety of entities have developed scoring models
30, including Fair Isaac and 
Company, large mortgage lenders (such as Countrywide and GE Capital), the Federal 
Housing Administration and Department of Veterans Affairs loan guarantee programs, 
the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, private 
mortgage insurance companies (such as PMI Mortgage Insurance Company and 
Mortgage Guarantee Insurance Corporation), and insurance companies.  However, the 
only federal review of the fairness of any such models was a HUD review of the GSE 
systems conducted in 2000, the findings of which are expected to be released soon
31.  
While the delayed release will limit the relevance of this review because the GSEs have 
made significant changes to their automated underwriting systems since the review was 
conducted, we recommend other agencies follow this example and conduct full reviews 
of all scoring systems in the marketplace. 
 
We recommend that appropriate government agencies, such as HUD, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and state insurance departments conduct regular, comprehensive 
evaluations of the validity and fairness of all credit scoring systems, including any 
automated mortgage underwriting systems, insurance underwriting systems, tenant and 
employee screening systems, or any other systems or software that uses credit data as part 
of its evaluation of consumers, and report to Congress with its findings.  These 
evaluations should be conducted and released in a timely fashion so that developers can 
react to any recommendations and so the reviews do not become outdated as new 
versions of scoring software are developed and distributed.  Strong oversight of scoring 
                                                 
30 Straka, John.  2000.  A Shift in the Mortgage Landscape: the 1990s Move to Automated Credit 
Evaluations.  Journal of Housing Research.  Volume 11, Issue 2. 
31 Felsenthal, Mark. “HUD Secretary – mortgage software bias study out soon.” Reuters. October 22, 2002.  
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systems that identifies and protects consumers from any abuses will foster consumer 
confidence in these powerful and increasingly utilized evaluation tools.    
 
E.  Address important questions and conduct further research.  
 
In the course of conducting this study, several questions arose which are not 
comprehensively addressed in this report, but are deserving of further attention and 
research.  This report primarily addresses the impact of wide variations in credit scores 
and credit data on consumers who are seeking credit – particularly mortgages.  Future 
studies should explore the impact of these variations on insurance availability and 
affordability, given the recent, dramatic increase in the use of credit scores as an 
insurance underwriting tool.  In addition, further research should address the impact of 
data and credit score variations on consumers as a result of other applications, such as 
tenant screening and employee screening.  Additional research could assess the value to 
consumers of fee-based credit monitoring services.   
 
Other topics raised in this report, but not exhaustively addressed, include determining the 
value to consumers of credit re-scoring relative to other means of credit data validation, 
the impact of anti-competitive market forces surrounding credit re-scoring, the privacy 
concerns surrounding the appearance of medical related information in credit reports, and 
ways to protect consumers from abusive applications of such medical information.  The 
FTC should promptly develop and require a mechanism to obscure medical debtor names 
in credit reports. 
 
The Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits states from enacting any laws that provide 
protections beyond those guaranteed by federal statute.  On January 1, 2004 this 
provision will expire, although the federal law will otherwise remain in place.  Contrary 
to some characterizations, the entire act will not “sunset” on this date.  This prohibition 
on supplemental state protections should not be extended, and if any changes to the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act are to be made at the federal level, they should result in greater 
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IX. Recommendations for Consumers 
 
Many of the concerns raised by this study address structural issues regarding the system 
of reporting and evaluating credit, which are beyond the scope of most consumers to 
influence.  However, there are some steps consumers can take to reduce the likelihood of 
errors occurring, or to address them when they arise. 
 
?  Maintain consistency in credit applications: use your full legal name when applying 
for credit. If you have a generational title (Sr., Jr., III) always specify this. 
 
?  Review your credit record regularly by purchasing a credit report and score from each 
major credit repository once a year. The repositories can be contacted at the following 
phone numbers and website addresses: Equifax (800) 685-1111 or www.equifax.com; 
Experian (888) EXPERIAN or www.experian.com; Trans Union (800) 888-4213 or 
www.transunion.com.  
 
?  Prior to applying for a mortgage, consider obtaining a current copy of your credit 
report and score from each major repository, and review it for errors.   
 
?  Dispute any errors that appear on your credit report by contacting the credit 
repository.  However, avoid “credit repair” businesses that claim to be able to erase 
valid items in consumers’ credit histories.   
 
?  Don’t underrate your credit.  Ask for specifics if a lender tells you that you have bad 
credit and don’t qualify.  Currently lenders do not have to tell you the specifics, or 
show you the credit report that they review, but they are permitted to.  If a lender 
refuses to talk to you about the specifics of your credit report, consider a different 
lender. 
 
?  If you have complaints about your credit report and are unable to have them quickly 
resolved, contact the Federal Trade Commission at 1-877-FTC-HELP or 
www.ftc.gov. 
 
 
 
 
 